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Note
Uncertainty Maintained:
The Split Decision Over Partisan Gerrymanders in
Vieth v. Jubelirer
Michael Weaver*

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the early years of the Republic, legislators have redrawn
electoral districts to achieve the greatest benefit to their political party,
but recently this practice has become more malicious. 1 For example, in
the 2002 Congressional elections, 356 out of the 435 House of
Representatives members' districts were decided by margins of more
than twenty percent and only four incumbents who faced nonincumbent challengers were defeated. 2 Only in the last forty years has
the judiciary entered the political thicket of apportionment. 3 Despite the
*
J.D. expected May 2006. I would like to thank the members and editorial board of the
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal for all of their advice and hard work, without which, this
article would not have been possible. Special thanks to Sarah Smith and Carina Segalini for
making the writing and editing process much more enjoyable. I also thank my family for their
constant support and all those who allowed me to discuss the finer details of legislative
apportionment.
1. A New Map: PartisanGerrymanderingas a Federalism Injury, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1196
(2004) (providing one example of the actions of the Governor and state legislature of Texas
creating a new electoral map simply based on political considerations and not on new census data
or a judicial order).
2. Fred Hiatt, Time to Draw the Line, WASH. POST, May 3, 2004, at A21.
3. See infra Part II.C (outlining the Court's role in apportionment related issues). The Court
first entered into the political thicket of apportionment in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962);
infra Part II.C. 1 (discussing the decision in Baker and its aftermath). In subsequent decisions, the
Court established the one person, one vote standard to resolve apportionment disputes. Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964). Based on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, the Court
affirmed that equal numbers of voters should elect equal numbers of representatives. Id. at 56061; infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the one person, one vote standard and the relevant cases).
Beyond the mathematical formula of one person, one vote, the Court developed the concept of
fair and effective representation when dealing with apportionment issues such as racial or partisan
See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing the concept of fair and effective
gerrymandering.
representation); infra Part II.C.4 (discussing the development of racial gerrymandering
jurisprudence).
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United States Supreme Court's activity, the Court has largely avoided
the apportionment-related issue of partisan gerrymandering.4 In 2002, a
federal district court faced the issue of partisan gerrymandering in Vieth
v. Pennsylvania,5 where Pennsylvania Democrats brought suit alleging
that the Pennsylvania
Legislature's redistricting plan violated their
6
constitutional rights.

The case eventually reached the United States Supreme Court, and
commentators viewed it as one of the more important cases in recent
memory. 7 However, the Court failed to live up to expectations. 8 A
fractured Court wrote five opinions, ultimately dismissing the claim.9 A

four-Justice plurality dismissed the political gerrymandering claim,
holding it was a non-justiciable political question. ° The five other
Justices disagreed as to the plurality's view of justiciability, but failed to
establish a majority standard for the lower courts.1 1 Instead of resolving
an important problem facing the nation, the Court created greater
4. See infra Part II.D (discussing the Court's history with partisan gerrymandering). The
Court's major decision dealing with partisan gerrymandering occurred in Davis v. Bandemer, 478
U.S. 109 (1986). A majority of six Justices determined partisan gerrymandering justiciable.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 119-20. The Court found plans that dilute the vote of political groups to
be constitutionally suspect. Id. However, the Court failed to establish a majority standard to
adjudicate these claims. Id.; see infra Part H.E. (discussing Davis v. Bandemer).
5. Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532 (M.D. Pa. 2002).
6. Id. at 534. A number of Pennsylvania Democrats alleged the new state congressional
redistricting plan violated the one person, one vote requirement and that it constituted an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. Id. at 536. The complaint stated that the plan trampled
the protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 537. A three-judge district court
initially found the plan unconstitutional, but a revised plan passed constitutional muster. Id.
7. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004). See J. Clark Kelso, Vieth v. Jubelirer:Judicial
Review of PoliticalGerrymanders,3 ELECTION L.J. 47, 51 (2004) ("Vieth may be one of the most
revealing and important voting cases since Baker v. Carr."); Jeffrey Toobin, The Great Election
Grab, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 8, 2003, at 63. ("[Vieth] could well become the court's most
important foray into the political process since Bush v. Gore.").
8. Charles Lane, Justices OrderNew Look at Tex Redistricting Case, GOP-CraftedPlan Stays
in Effect for this Election, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2003, at A21. "[Vieth] was a monumental nondecision, a case in which five justices said partisan gerrymandering cases can go forward, but also
said there is no standard by which to judge them." Id. (quoting Richard Hasen, election law
specialist, Loyola Law School in Los Angeles); John B. Anderson & Robert Richie, A Better Way
to Vote, LEGAL TIMES, May 17, 2004 (arguing that the Court could have taken dramatic action
that would have established an unambiguous standard for the country).
9. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1773. Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
an opinion. Id. Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 1792.
Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer each filed separate dissenting opinions. Id. at 1784; see infra
Part III.C (discussing the opinions of the Justices).
10. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1773. Justice Scalia wrote for the plurality, in which the Chief Justice
and Justices O'Connor and Thomas joined. Id. See infra Part HI.C.1 (discussing the plurality
opinion); infra Part II.B (discussing the concept of non-justiciable political questions).
11. See infra Part HI.C.2 (discussing the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy); infra Part
M.C.3 (discussing the dissenting opinions of Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer).
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confusion and prolonged the fight over partisan gerrymandering.12 In
the short term, the Vieth decision will alter neither the acts of the
partisan gerrymander nor the struggle to stop it. 13 Regardless, the

decision did open new14 avenues to explore the creation of judicially

manageable standards.
Part II of this Note will provide an overview of partisan
gerrymandering in the United States and the concept of the political
question doctrine. 15 Part II will also explain the development of
judicially manageable standards used to adjudicate claims related to
Part III will discuss the plurality, concurring, and
apportionment.
dissenting opinions from the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Vieth v. Jubelirer.17 Part IV will argue that the dissenting Justices
correctly held partisan gerrymandering is not a political question. 18 Part
IV will reason that Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion provided the

best judicially manageable standard with which to resolve partisan
gerrymandering disputes. 19 Part V will examine the effects that Vieth
created for lower courts struggling to resolve partisan gerrymandering
to
This Note will conclude by asserting that Vieth 2failed
cases.
1
future.
the
in
one
for
foundation
a
laid
but
provide a resolution,

12. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of
PoliticalGerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 578 (2004); see infra Part IV (analyzing the
decision in Vieth).
13. See infra Part V.A (discussing the short term impact of Vieth); infra note 425 (discussing
the Supreme Court decision of Cox v. Larios, 124 S. Ct. 2806 (2004), rendered shortly after Vieth,
which dealt with legislative apportionment).
14. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex. 2004), vacated by, 1235 S. Ct. 351
(2004) (involving the longstanding feud over the redistricting plan in Texas). The Supreme Court
ordered a three-judge panel to take into account the Vieth decision and review the court's decision
allowing a gerrymandered congressional districting plan to be implemented. Charles Lane,
Justices Order New Look at Texas Redistricting Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2003, at A21. See
infra Part V.B (discussing the long term impact of Vieth); infra note 61-62 & 435 (discussing the
Session decision).
15. See infra Part II (outlining the concept of gerrymandering and the doctrine of political
question).
16. See infra Part II (discussing the development of judicial standards dealing with
gerrymandering and apportionment claims).
17. See infra Part III.C.1 (discussing the plurality opinion in Vieth); infra Part III.C.2
(discussing the concurring opinion in Vieth); infra Part III.C.3 (discussing the dissenting opinions
in Vieth).
18. See infra Part IV.A (analyzing the correctness of the dissenting opinions).
19. See infra Part IV.C (analyzing Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion).
20. See infra Part V (discussing the effects of Vieth upon lower courts attempting to adjudicate
partisan gerrymandering claims).
21. See infra Part V (explaining how Court precedent provided the foundation to develop
manageable standards).
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II. BACKGROUND

The development of partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence in the
United States laid the foundation for the Court's decision in Vieth.22
This Part will explain the path the Court reached in declaring partisan
gerrymandering justiciable and the Court's struggle with establishing
standards of review. 23 Part II.A will provide a brief history of partisan
gerrymandering in the United States. 24 Part II.B will discuss the

political question doctrine, a doctrine used for many years to exclude
partisan gerrymandering from judicial review. 2 5 Part II.C will trace the
judicial steps of creating manageable standards that ultimately lead to
the decision in Vieth. 26 Part II.D will review the Court's treatment of
the partisan gerrymander before it was declared justiciable. 27 Part II.E
will explore the Supreme Court decision of Davis v. Bandemer,2 8 which
made partisan gerrymandering judicially reviewable, and its effect on
9
partisan gerrymandering claims.
A. The Gerrymanderin the United States
While the Court's role in gerrymandering disputes developed only in
the last forty years, gerrymandering has been _part of the United States'
political process since the Nation's founding.
Part II.A.1 will define
the concept of gerrymandering. 3 1 Part II.A.2 will review the history of
32
gerrymandering in the United States.

22. See infra Part II (discussing the development of apportionment law jurisprudence).
23. See infra Part II.A-E (discussing the history of gerrymandering in the United States and
the courts' attempts to develop judicial standards to counter the harms).
24. See infra Part II.A (discussing the history and the concept of gerrymandering in the United
States).
25. See infra Part I.B (discussing the political question doctrine).
26. See infra Part II.C (discussing the application of judicially manageable standards to
apportionment and other election disputes involving the Equal Protection Clause).
27. See infra Part II.D (reviewing the first Supreme Court cases dealing with partisan
gerrymandering).

28. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
29. See infra Part .E (discussing Davis v. Bandemer, which established that partisan
gerrymandering claims were justiciable, and lower court decisions attempting to apply the
Bandemer standards).
30. ELMER C. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER (Leon Stein

ed., ArnoPress 1974) (1907) (providing a comprehensive history of gerrymandering from the
colonial period until 1842 and the advent of wide-spread use of single-member districts in the
United States).
31. See infra Part II.A. 1 (discussing the general concept of gerrymandering and its impact on
elections).
32. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the history of gerrymandering in the United States).
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1. What is a Gerrymander?
Gerrymandering is the method of creating electoral districts that
provide the greatest electoral benefit to the political party drawing the
boundaries. 33 It is normally viewed as a dishonest activity and has been
criticized for a variety of reasons. 34 The main criticism arising from the
actions of the gerrymander is the ability of the minority to dilute the will

of the majority. 35 The scope of what gerrymandering encompasses is
not always clear.36 Traditionally, the power of apportionment has been
33. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas J., concurring) (describing
gerrymandering as "the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries and populations
for partisan or personal political purposes"). "[G]errymandering should be taken to encompass
all apportionment and districting arrangements which transmute one party's actual voter strength
into the maximum of legislative seats and transmute the other party's actual voter strength into
the minimum of legislative seats." ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION:
REAPPORTIONMENT INLAW AND POLITICS 460 (1968).
34. GRIFFITH, supra note 30, at 8 ("One of the most unpatriotic acts of legislation possible is a
gerrymander."). Griffith argues gerrymandering is "a species of fraud, deception, and trickery
which menaces the perpetuity of the Republic of the United States ... for it deals ...with
representative government." Id. at 7. Griffith viewed gerrymandering as evil because "it is
cloaked under the guise of law" and "[a] political injustice is given the stamp of government and
is embodied in a law." Id. at 8.
35. See id. at 21 (viewing gerrymandering as "a system of political discrimination"). Griffith
viewed gerrymandering as a fraudulent political trick, which can destroy the principles of
republican government. Id. at 7. For Griffith, gerrymandering is a "flagrant wrong that threatens
the perpetuity and stability of our political institutions." Id.; see also Michael E. Lewyn, How to
Limit Gerrymandering, 45 FLA. L. REv. 403, 407 (1993) (discussing the various criticisms of
gerrymandering and specifically partisan gerrymandering). But see, MARK E. RUSH, DOES
REDISTRICTING MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 3 (1993) (arguing the real difficulty is the Court's idea
that political groups are entitled to equal representational opportunities despite the inequalities
inherent in a winner-take-all single-member district system).
"[I]n [a single member plurality district] system, the opportunity to be represented is
for all intents and purposes the opportunity to vote with a group of like-minded voters
large enough to be a majority in a given district. When, therefore, does losing become
tantamount to denial of representational opportunity?"
Id.
36. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 708 (8th ed. 2004) (defining gerrymandering as "[tihe
practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts, often of highly irregular shape, to
give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposition's voting strength."); see
Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The Court, The People, and "One Man, One Vote", in REAPPORTIONMENT
IN THE 1970s 29 (Nelson W. Polsby ed., 1971) [hereinafter Dixon, One Man, One Vote]
("Gerrymandering is simply discriminatory districting which operates unfairly to inflate the
political strength of one group and deflate that of another."); ANDREW HACKER,
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING: THE ISSUE OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 46 (1963)
("Gerrymandering in short, is the art of political cartography.").
The term gerrymander
incorporates a number of meanings. Gordon E. Baker, Gerrymandering:PrivilegedSanctuary or
Next Judicial Target?, in REAPPORTIONMENT INTHE 1970S 122 (Nelson W. Polsby ed., 1971). A
silent gerrymander is when the legislature fails to redistrict at all, which was the situation in
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Id.; see infra Part II.C.I (discussing the Supreme Court case
of Baker v. Carr). An incumbent-protecting gerrymander or bipartisan gerrymander arises when
leaders of both parties agree to create districts in order "to preserve or enhance the electoral
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part of the legislative branch and controlled by the political party in
power.3 7 Usually, those charged with creating voting districts create
districts that give a benefit to a specific group in elections. 38 These
districts are labeled gerrymandered when they do not conform to
traditional districting principles. 39 Districts are usually gerrymandered

on the basis of race or politics. 40 Occasionally, gerrymandering can be
prospects of current officeholders." GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY'S
SALAMANDER: THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 18
(2002). Nevertheless, the most notorious type of gerrymander happens when district lines are
created in a manner that benefits the party or faction in charge of the process. Baker, supra, at
131. Mark Rush concluded that gerrymandering is a problematic concept because of ambiguity
regarding: (1) the identity of the injured parties; (2) the meaning of representation; and (3) what
constitutes a denial of the fair opportunity to be represented. RUSH, supra note 35, at 2. A
number of models have been established in an attempt to assess fair representation. Id. at 59
(discussing some standard criteria used to assess gerrymandering).
37. Dixon, One Man, One Vote, supra note 36, at 35. "[T]he responsibility for revising
election districts is almost always placed, at least initially, with an elected legislative body."
Richard L. Engstrom, The Political Thicket, Electoral Reform, and Minority Voting Rights, in
FAIR AND EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION? 7 (Mark E. Rush & Richard L. Engstrom eds., 2001).
Redistricting is the redrawing of district lines, usually maintaining the same number of electoral
districts. RCHARD K. SCHER ET AL., VOTING RIGHTS & DEMOCRACY: THE LAW AND
POLITICS OF DISTRICTING 4 (1997). Reapportionment implies a change in the number of seats, as
well as the redrawing of lines. Id. The U.S. House of Representatives, state legislatures, and
many local legislatures are based on the idea of equal representation of the population, which
requires continual reapportionment to ensure population equity is achieved. Id. The creation of
Congressional district boundaries occurs in two phases. DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN,
CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 43 (1992).
The first phase is the constitutionally and statutorily mandated decennial U.S. census, which
measures changes in the population. SCHER, supra at 4. After the census is completed, the
number of Congressional seats are allotted based on population to the fifty States. See BUTLER &
CAIN, supra, at 43-46 (describing the mathematical formulation used to allocate Congressional
seats). Next, the States adjust the congressional district boundaries to comply with the allocation.
Id. at 44.
38. See Dixon, One Man, One Vote, supra note 36, at 29 (considering all redistricting to
involve gerrymandering); see also Robert N. Clinton, Further Explorations in the Political
Thicket: The Gerrymanderand the Constitution,59 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1973) ("The gerrymander
problem obviously arises from our geographic base for political representation.").
39. See SCHER, supra note 37, at 40 (listing principles involved in the redistricting and
reapportionment process). Traditional districting principles include minority fairness, political
fairness, contiguity, compactness, preservation of communities of interest, continuity of
representation and district cores, avoidance of pairing, and respect for political boundaries and
topographical features. Id. See also J. Gerald Hebert, The Realists' Guide to Redistricting, 2000
A.B.A. SEC. ADMIN. L. & REG. PRAC. 59-65 (describing the different traditional districting
principles). However, not all commentators believe these traditional principles are necessary in
order to provide proper representation. E.g., Dixon, One Man, One Vote, supra note 36, at 29-30
(owing to modem technology, the standards of contiguity and compactness are not as necessary
as the other principles to achieve legitimate representation).
40. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING TASK FORCE, at
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redistred2000/Ch3part2.htm (updated Oct. 31,
2003) [hereinafter Redistricting Task Force] (discussing the concept of racial gerrymandering);
see Lewyn, supra note 35, at 405 (defining partisan gerrymandering as "gaining through
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used as a positive tool when serving the interests of historically underrepresented minority groups. 4 1 In these cases, the inherent evil of
with the historical need to empower
gerrymandering must be tempered
42
under-represented groups.
Two techniques are employed to gerrymander districts: packing and
cracking. 4 3 Packing occurs when the boundaries of an electoral district
are changed in order to create an area that incorporates a majority of

people who vote in a similar way. 44 Packing "wastes" votes by creating
a few districts with super-majorities of like-minded voters, making it
easier for the party in power to win or maintain control in the majority
Cracking arises when an area with a high
of the other districts.
concentration of similar voters is split among several districts, ensuring
that these voters have a small minority in several districts rather than 46a
large majority in one, thereby diluting the voting power of the group.
Regardless of the method employed, the outcome of gerrymandering is
discretionary districting an unjustifiable advantage for one political party as opposed to the
others.") (quoting Charles Backtrom et al., Issues in Gerrymandering:An Explanatory Measure
of PartisanGerrymanderingApplied to Minnesota, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1121, 1129 (1978)).
41. Redistricting Task Force, supra note 40 (discussing the use of gerrymandering to benefit
minority voters). This type of gerrymandering, such as the creation of minority-majority districts,
is done when electoral districts are developed in order to redress a long overlooked imbalance in
representation of minority groups. T. Thomas Singer, ReappraisingReapportionment, 22 GONZ.
L. REv. 527, 533-34 (1987); see infra Part II.C.4 (discussing the impact of affirmative action
racial gerrymandering on minorities).
42. See Singer, supra note 41, at 533-35 (discussing the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the
Court's attempt to protect minority representation). This balancing act is one reason why
gerrymandering is viewed as a difficult issue for the courts. Dixon, One Man, One Vote, supra
note 36, at 29-30. "The primary difficulty in forming standards is that the familiar criteria, even
including that of equal population, tend to fail at the outset by not recognizing the complexity of
the ultimate goal of fair and effective political representation for all significant groups." Id. at 30.
43. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 12, at 551-52 (providing examples of how packing and
cracking is used to create gerrymandered districts); see Clinton, supra note 38, at 3-4 (discussing
the various tools used by the gerrymander); Lewyn, supra note 35, at 406 (discussing the specific
concepts of packing and cracking).
44. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1140 (8th ed. 2004) (defining packing as "[a]
gerrymandering technique in which a dominant political or racial group minimizes minority
representation by concentrating the minority into as few districts as possible."). The goal of
packing is to "waste" minority votes. SOUTHERN REGIONAL COUNCIL, VOTING RIGHTS
GLOSSARY, at http://www.southerncouncil.org/helpnet/glossary (last visited Apr. 23, 2005)
[hereinafter Voting Rights Glossary].
45. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 12, at 552.
46. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 395 (8th ed. 2004) (defining cracking as "[a] gerrymandering
technique in which a geographically concentrated political or racial group that is large enough to
constitute a district's dominant force is broken up by district lines and dispersed throughout two
or more districts"). Cracking "diminishes the ability of minority voters to elect representatives of
their choice to office by separating the minority population in the redistricting process into two or
more districts each with insufficient minority population to constitute an electoral majority."
Voting Rights Glossary, supra note 44.
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to draw boundaries in such a way that the groups opposing the new
boundaries4 7 are concentrated so as to minimize their representation and
influence.
2. History of the Gerrymander
Vieth is not the first time Pennsylvania residents argued over
apportionment. 4 8 During the colonial period, Pennsylvania counties
fought over equitable representation, foreshadowing the future problems
of apportionment. 49 Even with the colonial disputes, it took another
hundred years for the term gerrymander to be coined in the United
States. 50 The term combines the word "salamander" with the last name

of Vice President Elbridge Gerry, who served under President Madison
and was the former Governor of Massachusetts. 5 1 This term developed
in 1812 when Massachusetts redistricted its electoral boundaries, and
some thought an illustration of one of the new districts resembled a
salamander. 52
Elbridge Gerry, who was then the Governor of
Massachusetts, signed the plan into law, forever attaching his name to
the term. 53 The term quickly entered into the lexicon of American
47. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 12, at 551-53; see HACKER, supra note 36, at 54
(providing an example how gerrymandering worked in the 1962 elections).
48. GRIFFITH, supra note 30, at 26.
49. Id. In 1701, the Charter of Privileges for colonial Pennsylvania decreed the assemblies
should consist of four people from each county and two from the city of Philadelphia. Id. The
number of representatives from each county increased from four to eight in 1705. Id. Eventually,
this structure created animosity between the counties of Bucks, Chester, and Philadelphia against
the city of Philadelphia. Id. at 27. As the population of Philadelphia grew, the counties political
supremacy was threatened. Id. at 28. Three counties forced the city of Philadelphia to maintain
the charter provision until 1771. Id. at 27-28. The continuation of the provision prevented equal
representation of the city in the assembly based on population. Id. at 29. However, Pennsylvania
also became the first state to limit the workings of the political gerrymander. See, e.g., id. at 4345 (describing the state constitutional provision that attempted to restrain gerrymandering).
50. See id. at 16-17 (providing a detailed account of the creation of the term gerrymander).
The term first appeared in a Boston Gazette article entitled "The Gerrymander" on March 26,
1812. Id. at 17 n.1.
The article described districts recently created by a Massachusetts
apportionment act. Id. at 16-17. The Massachusetts Democrat-Republican (Jeffersonian) party
created the districts in the apportionment act in order to dilute the strength of the Federalist Party.
RUSH, supra note 35, at 2.
51. GRIFFITH, supra note 30, at 17. Governor Gerry contributed to the United States more
then just providing the "Gerry" to gerrymander. Id. at 19. Governor Gerry was a member of the
Continental Congress, signed the Declaration of Independence, was elected to Congress, became
Governor of Massachusetts and served as the fifth Vice President of the United States. Id.
Representative Gerry also made the first motion in Congress to establish the Library of Congress.
Id.
52. Id. at 17. The districts created by the apportionment act formed bizarre shapes that
separated single towns from their proper counties. Id. One district, specifically the outer district
of Essex county, formed what many considered a very unusual shape. Id.
53. Id.
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politics.
Over the last two hundred years, gerrymandering has thrived, and
continues to do so today. 55 Recent Congressional elections illustrate the
continued success of the gerrymander. 5 6 The 2004 election of the
House of Representatives was the fourth consecutive election in which
57
In
the incumbent success rate was at least ninety-eight percent.
general, due to gerrymandering, races for seats in the House of
the years. 5 8
Representatives have become less and less competitive over
54. Id. at 19. The Boston Gazette went so far as to declare the term was synonymous with
deception. Id. "When a man has been swindled out of his rights by a villain, he says he has been
gerrymandered." Id. (quoting from the Boston Gazette, April 8, 1813). However, the general
understanding of the word referred to the creation of districts for partisan advantage based on
artificial and arbitrary delineation. Id. at 20.
55. See Sasha Abramsky, The Redistricting Wars, THE NATION, Dec. 11, 2003, at 15
(illustrating how new technology allows sophisticated mapping programs to generate
devastatingly accurate district maps designed to pack or crack specific groups); see also Cox v.
Larios, 124 S. Ct. 2806 (2004) (dealing with a challenge to Georgia's legislative reapportionment
plan for the State House of Representatives and Senate). The Supreme Court rendered its
decision on June 30, 2004, only a few months after the Vieth decision. Id. at 2806. The lower
court in Cox struck down a redistricting plan for the Georgia legislature on grounds that it failed
to comply with one-person, one-vote requirements. Id. at 2807. The Supreme Court summary
affirmed the Cox decision. Id. at 2806. Justice Stevens wrote, "after our recent decision in
[Vieth], the equal-population principle remains the only clear limitation on improper districting
practices, and we must be careful not to dilute its strength." Id. at 2808. See infra notes 425-28
(discussing the impact of Vieth on the Cox decision); infra Part II.C. 1-4 (discussing the Supreme
Court cases involving gerrymandering).
56. Steve Chapman, Can Arnold Help to Restore True Democracy? BALT. SUN, Jan. 11, 2005,
at I IA. "In 2004, 95 percent of all victors won by more then 10 percentage points, and 83
percent won by more then 20 percent." Id. In the 2002 Congressional elections, out of the 435
seats, 356 races were decided by margins of more then twenty percent. Fred Hiatt, Time to Draw
the Line, WASH. POST, May 3, 2004, at A21. Only four incumbents who faced non-incumbent
challengers were defeated. Id. Only forty-three House incumbents won reelection "narrowly"
defined as winning by less than sixty percent of the vote, while 338 House incumbents enjoyed
victory margins of twenty percent or more, including seventy-eight incumbents who ran
unopposed by a major party challenger. Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory? 153 U. PA. L. REv. 459,
477 (2004). More than a third of all State House delegations remained the same after the
election. Id. In the same election, numerous U.S. Senate elections were extremely competitive.
Id. at 486. Congressional gerrymandering in California fashioned an election without one
competitive race. Gary C. Jacobson, Terror, Terrain,and Turnout: Explaining the 2002 Midterm
Elections, 118 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 10 (2003). In California, not a single challenger in the general
election received as much as forty percent of the vote. Ortiz, supra, at 477.
57. JOHN SAMPLES & PATRICK BASHAM, CATO INSTITUTE, ONCE AGAIN, INCUMBENTS ARE
THE BIG WINNERS, available at http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pub-id=2889 (Apr. 23,
2005) [hereinafter INCUMBENTS].
58. See Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the
Latest Round of Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L.J. 179 (2003) (discussing how
"redistricting has helped to transform the U.S. House of Representatives into a body that will no
longer accurately reflect majority will"). Historically, redistricting after the census creates more
competitive Congressional races in the '02 years. Jacobson, supra note 56, at 10. However, only
four non-incumbent challengers won in the 2002 U.S. House of Representatives election, which
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Only sixteen of the 435 seats in the House of Representatives shifted
from one party to the other following the 2004 election. 5 9 The dispute

over gerrymandering has become a battle for political survival, with
each new districting plan more wantonly partisan than the last. 60 Some
redistricting plans have even moved beyond the traditional gerrymander
and taken the form of the so-called "perrymander," named after
Governor Rick Perry of Texas. 6 1 A perrymander occurs when a
political party controls both houses of the state legislature and the
governor's office and redistricts the state's electoral boundaries without

new census data or a judicial order requiring a new plan. 6 2 Many

viewed the Texas plan as the zenith of partisan gerrymandering since it
intended to create an additional seven safe Republican seats in the

was the lowest number of successful challenges in any U.S. general election. Id. at 11. The
number of races classified as "tossup" or "leaning" prior to the 2002 election amount to only
fourty-eight. Id. at 10. This is compared to the 1992 election that had 103 tossup races and the
1982 election that had eighty-four tossup races. Id.
59. Patrick O'Connor, Dems Waitedfor Breeze that Never Came, THE HILL, Dec. 15, 2004, at
14. The sixteen party changes included two Democrats who switched parties before the election
and four Texas Democrats who lost the election mainly due to the redistricting plan implemented
in Texas. Id.; see infra note 62 (discussing the Texas redistricting plan). Outside of Texas, only
three incumbents lost reelection in 2004. O'Connor, supra, at 14. Nearly a third of the
incumbents faced either no challenger or one without campaign funds. INCUMBENTS, supra note
57.
60. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, JIGSAW POLITICS: SHAPING THE HOUSE AFTER THE 1990
CENSUS 3 (1990) [hereinafter JIGSAW POLITICS]. Issacharoff identified the relatively new
technique of "shacking" as a method to reduce voter representation. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra
note 12, at 552. Shacking does not focus on the voter, but on the actual incumbent representative.
Id. Shacking occurs when redistricting excludes an incumbent's residence from the district of the
incumbent's current constituents. Id. Shacking can also occur when redistricting places two
incumbents, normally from the same party, into one district forcing them to compete against each
other. Id. at 552-53.
61. John Ratliff, Texas Republicans Crossed the Line This Time, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2003,
at B 1. As governor of Texas, Perry helped to promote the Texas redistricting plan challenged in
Session v. Perry. Id.
62. A New Map: PartisanGerrymandering as a Federalism Injury, supra note 1, at 1196
(viewing perrymandering as the "ultimate partisan gerrymander").
Traditionally, state
legislatures redraw Congressional and other legislative districts after the national Census, which
occurs every ten years. JIGSAW POLITICS supra note 60, at 3. Recently, the decennial tradition
has been broken through the introduction of redistricting plans in Colorado and Texas outside the
ten-year period. Abramsky, supra note 55. The Texas gerrymander saga involved Democrat
state senators fleeing to Okalahoma and New Mexico to prevent a quorum, while the Republicans
contacted local federal law enforcement officials to track down the Senators. Id. The Colorado
Supreme Court struck down that state's gerrymandered plan. Id. The Colorado Supreme Court
ruled that the state constitution only allowed redistricting to occur once per census, and nullified
the new redistricting plan. Id.; see People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1237 (2003)
(striking down Colorado General Assembly's attempt to redistrict outside the usual decennial
census process); see generally Michael A. Carvin, "A Legislative Task": Why Four Types of
Redistricting Challenges are Not, or Should Not Be, Recognized by Courts, 4 ELECTION L. J. 2,
40-50 (2005) (providing an in-depth discussion of the Colorado decision).
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closely-divided U.S. House of Representatives, outside the usual
decennial process. 63 Regardless, even in the current environment, some
6 4 The
have attempted to find new ways to combat gerrymandering.

possible ability of legislatures to rein in the gerrymander lends support
to the idea that partisan gerrymandering is a non-justiciable political
65
and redundant.
question, making the role of the courts unnecessary

63. Richard L. Hasen, Looking For Standards (In All the Wrong Places): Partisan
Gerrymandering Claims After Vieth, 3 ELECTION L.J. 626, 627 (2004). Following the 2002
election, Texas Republicans gained unified control of the State's legislature. Linda Greenhouse,
Justices Revive Texas DistrictingChallenge, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2004, at A4. Under prodding
from Republicans House Majority Leader Tom DeLay, the state Republicans redistricted the
congressional seats of Texas outside the normal ten-year period. Toobin, supra note 7, at 63.
Less then two years before, the existing district plan had been implemented following the 2000
Holding successive special legislative sessions, the
Greenhouse, supra, at 14.
census.
Republicans over strong objections by the Democrats, passed a new plan shifting more then eight
million people into new districts, splitting one Democratic district into five pieces, and pairing six
Democratic and Republican incumbents in district redrawn to favor the Republican. Id. The map
included a district that stretched 340 miles from Rio Grande City near the Mexican border to the
State Capitol in Austin. Ratliff, supra note 61, at B1; see Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451
(E.D. Tex. 2004), vacated by, 125 S. Ct. 351 (2004) (considering the Texas redistricting plan).
64. Joe Hadfield, Arnold Takes on the Gerrymander,CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, Feb. 2005, at
21 (highlighting that states using an independent approach in redistricting created twice as many
competitive races then gerrymandered states). In 1981, Iowa created a nonpartisan arm of the
legislature that creates the congressional districts for the state. Adam Clymer, Why Iowa Has So
Many Hot Seats, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2002 §4, at 5. The organization uses computer programs
to create compact, contiguous districts that disregard partisanship and incumbency. Id. However,
some criticize the plan since it does not focus on incumbent protection. Id. This lack of
protection could lead to a senior member of Congress being removed from office, which for a
small state like Iowa could reduce its overall influence in Congress. Id. Justice Souter's dissent
in Vieth even attempted to find a new method to combat gerrymandering by incorporating the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting method used in discrimination cases. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124
S. Ct. 1769, 1817 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting). The McDonnell Douglas test initially was used
in Title VII claims alleging racial discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973). Under the McDonnell Douglas test, the plaintiff is required to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination. Id. at 802. The plaintiff must show: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a
racial minority; (2) the plaintiff applied for and was qualified for an open position; (3) the
plaintiff did not receive the position; and (4) after refusing to hire the applicant, the employer
kept the position open and continued to seek applicants with similar qualifications to the plaintiff.
Id. Once the plaintiff established a prima facie case, the burden then shifted to the employer to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason why the plaintiff was not hired. Id. If the
employer articulated a legitimate reason, the plaintiff was allowed to show the proffered reason is
pretextual. Id. at 804; see infra Part III.C.3.b (discussing Justice Souter's new method to combat
partisan gerrymandering).
65. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1775 (plurality opinion) (finding the "power bestowed on Congress to
regulate elections, and in particular to restrain the practice of political gerrymandering, has not
lain dormant"); see infra note 267 (providing a list of the various congressional acts); see also
Joseph C. Coates, III, The Court Confronts the Gerrymander, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 351, 36671 (1987); Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial
Acquiescence to Incumbent-ProtectingGerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 679 (2002).
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B. The PoliticalQuestion Doctrine
The political question doctrine normally refers to subjects the courts
deem not applicable to judicial consideration. 66 Under the doctrine, the
question is whether the advocated constitutional provisions provide

rights that the courts can enforce against parties in litigation. 67 Political
questions fall within the principle of justiciability. 6 8 The justiciability
requirement places an obligation on parties to litigate an actual "case or
controversy." 69 The doctrine is closely connected to the separation of

powers principle, in that political questions exclude from judicial
review
controversies
which
revolve around
determinations
constitutionally committed for resolution to Congress, state legislatures,

66. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 76 (2001). However, the desire to seek

protection of a political right does not automatically mean the issue is a political question. 16A
AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 265 (2004) [hereinafter Constitutional Law § 265]; see
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 99 (2d ed. 1988) ("An issue is political
not because it is one of particular concern to the political branches of government but because the
constitutional provisions which litigants would invoke as guides to resolution of the issue do not
lend themselves to judicial application."). See generally Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than
Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102

COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002) (providing a detailed account of the rise and fall of the political
question doctrine).
67. TRIBE, supra note 66, at 98.
68. Id. (noting political question cases delve into the limits of judicial competency making
them part of the justiciability doctrine). "The justiciability of a controversy depends not upon the
existence of a federal statue, but upon whether a judicial resolution of that controversy would be
consistent with the separation of powers principles embodied in the Constitution, to which all
courts must adhere even in the absence of an explicit statutory command." ConstitutionalLaw,
supra note 66, § 265; see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (plurality opinion).
Justiciability is of course not a legal concept with a fixed content or susceptible to
scientific verification. Its utilization is the resultant of many subtle pressures,
including the appropriateness of the issues for decision by this Court and the actual
hardship to the litigants of denying them the relief sought.
Id. at 508-09. See generally TRIBE, supra note 66, at 67-72 (outlining the doctrine of
justiciability).
69. Article I of the United States Constitution limits the judicial power to only "cases and
controversies." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This requirement limits federal jurisdiction to
issues capable of being resolved by the courts and maintains a separation of powers between the
branches of government. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (defining the role and
jurisdiction of federal courts in a tripartite government).
In part those words [case and controversy] limit the business of federal courts to
questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as
capable of resolution through the judicial process. And in part those words define the
role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal
courts will not intrude into areas committed to other branches of government.
Justiciability is the term of art employed to give expression to this dual limitation
placed upon federal courts by the case-and-controversy doctrine.
Id. at 95.
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or the executive branch. 70 The essential quality of a political question is
the court's desire to avoid conflict with a co-equal branch of the

government in violation of the primary authority of that coordinate
is a mixture of constitutional interpretation and
branch. 7 1 The doctrine
72
judicial discretion.
The Supreme Court's development of the political question doctrine
Marbury is famous for
dates back to Marbury v. Madison.73
establishing the authority of the judiciary to review the constitutionality
of executive and legislative acts.74 The Marbury Court also sketched

the notion of a political question. 75 The Court first applied the political
question doctrine in Luther v. Borden.7 6 There, the Court faced
prospect of determining the legitimate government of Rhode Island
whether the state government violated the Guaranty Clause of
Constitution. 77 The Court concluded that the issue fell outside

the
and
the
the

70. Constitutional Law § 265, supra note 66; see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962)
("The non-justiciability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of
powers."); TRIBE, supra note 66, at 107 (judging the political question doctrine "reflects the
mixture of constitutional interpretation and judicial discretion which is an inevitable by-product
of the efforts of federal courts to define their own limitations"). See generally Themes Karalis,
Foreign Policy and Separation of Powers Jurisprudence: Executive Orders Regarding Export
AdministrationAct Extension in Times of Lapse as a Political Question, 12 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 109, 140-47 (discussing the history and development of the separation of powers
doctrine).
71. See United States Dep't. of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 458 (1992) (invoking
the political question doctrine acknowledges the possibility that a constitutional provision may
not be judicially enforceable, but that decision is far different from determining that the specific
action does not violate the Constitution); 20 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE DESKBOOK § 15 (2002) ("[P]olitical-question doctrine
purports to establish that a particular question is beyond judicial competence no matter who raises
it, how immediate the interest it affects, or how burning the controversy. Judicial incompetence
to decide is in effect found to be beyond the help or needs of any adversaries.").
72. TRIBE, supra note 66, at 107.
73. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). At issue was whether Congress acted
unconstitutionally in conferring upon the Court authority to issue original writs of mandamus,
which was not included in the Court's original jurisdiction as defined by the Constitution. TRIBE,
supra note 66, at 23.
74. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 66, at 39. The case confirmed the "basic assumption that the
Constitution is judicially declarable law." TRIBE, supra note 66, at 97.
75. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170 (stating "[q]uestions, in their nature political, or which are, by the
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court").
76. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
77. Lather, 48 U.S. at 34-37. The dispute followed the Dorr Rebellion in which a number of
Rhode Island citizens unsuccessfully challenged the charter government to adopt a new and more
democratic constitution. Id. The specific issue involved the actions of charter government
soldiers in ending the rebellion. Id. The Guaranty Clause mandates "[t]he United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each
of them against invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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realm of judicial competence and that Congress, through the power of
the Guaranty Clause, had the capacity to make the proper
determination. 7 8 Through the development of the political question
doctrine, the Supreme Court established areas that fell within the
doctrine; however, the boundaries of these areas have not always been
clear. 79 Importantly, claims involving "political
issues" have normally
8
0
doctrine.
question
political
the
of
fallen outside
The Court delineated the boundaries of the political question doctrine
in Baker v. Carr.8 1 The case involved the apportionment of the

Tennessee Assembly.

The Assembly had not been reapportioned in

78. Luther, 48 U.S. at 41-44.
79. See Charles M. Lamb, Judicial Restraint on the Supreme Court, in SUPREME COURT
AcTIVIsM AND RESTRAINT 21 (Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1982) (noting the
meaning of a political question can be expanded or contracted to meet the conditions of the time).
Political questions "are at least as real as Santa Clauses in department stores before Christmas.
We have to know what to do about them even if we believe they ought not to be there." WRIGHT
& KANE supra note 71, § 15 (quoting Zechariah Chafee, Jr.). Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) is
a recent example of the lack of clarity related to the political question doctrine. Mark Tushnet,
Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformational Disappearanceof the
Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1203, 1229 (2002) (stating the issue of justiciability
was never truly raised in Bush v. Gore).
80. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (finding no political question related to
determining a State's proper method in selecting electors); United States Dep't of Commerce v.
Montana, 503 U.S. 422, 458 (1992) (reversing a judgment holding unconstitutional a 1941 statute
prescribing method of "equal proportions" as the method to be used for determining the number
of representatives to which each State was entitled, and concluding that the issue was "political"
only insofar as it "raised an issue of great importance to the political branches"); United States v.
Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) (holding a dispute under the Origination Clause, which
mandates that all bills for raising revenue originate in the House of Representatives, did not
present a non-justiciable political question); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (holding
that the intra-executive nature of the dispute between President Nixon and a special prosecutor
did not give rise to a political question); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (concluding
that the political question doctrine did not bar review of the House of Representatives' exercise of
the Article I, section 5 power to judge the qualifications of its members). But see, e.g., Nixon v.
United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (concluding the Constitution's textually demonstrable
commitment to the Senate of the conduct of impeachment trials prevented court review of the
specific Senate impeachment procedures); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (per curiam)
(summarily vacating the decision of a court of appeals holding that the President had the power to
terminate a treaty with Taiwan without the approval of the Senate, but dividing over the extent
that the political question doctrine controlled in the case); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973)
(invoking the political question doctrine by finding a lack of standards for the court to determine
the validity of training of the Ohio National Guard under the Fourteenth Amendment); Coleman
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (finding no basis in the Constitution to determine the length of
time allowed to ratify an amendment to the Constitution); Luther, 48 U.S. at 41-44 (holding the
Guaranty Clause providing a republican form of government fell within the powers of another
branch).
81. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
82. BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 37, at 27. Tennessee city voters brought the suit arguing the
gross inequalities in district populations for the state assembly violated the Tennessee constitution
and the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 29. The lack of reapportionment created a 23 to 1
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sixty years, despite a state constitutional requirement that representation
be based on population, and significant changes in population had
occurred since the last reapportionment in 1901. 83 For many years, the
Court had maintained that reapportionment was a political question, and
the Court had no role in settling disputes. 8 4 Regardless of the past, the
Court in Baker determined apportionment was no longer a political
question. 85 The Court articulated six factors to determine whether the
issue in dispute was a non-justiciable political question. 86 These six

factors gave the Court a structure in which to analyze political question
issues.87 Since Baker, the Court has continued to apply these factors,
rarely finding an issue to be a non-justiciable political question.88 The
Baker decision

initiated

and

established

the

Court's

role

in

disparity between the largest and smallest district in the Tennessee House and a 6 to I disparity in
the Tennessee Senate. Id.
83. Baker, 369 U.S. at 190-91; see RICHARD CLAUDE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS, 154-55 (1970) (discussing the issues raised by the plaintiffs and
defendants in Baker); Phil C. Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, in THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION, 189-90 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1965) (providing a background
to the situation in Tennessee at the time of the case).
84. See TRIBE, supra note 66, at 98-100 (providing an overview of Supreme Court cases
leading to Baker); see also Wood v. Brown, 287 U.S. 1, 8 (1932) (involving, for the first
significant time, the question of apportionment justiciability); see generally WRIGHT & KANE,
supra note 71, at § 15 (describing earlier Supreme Court cases involving the political question
doctrine). Wood involved the refusal of the Court to invalidate a Mississippi law that had created
districts of unequal populations. Wood, 287 U.S. at 8. Four Justices asserted that the Court did
not have jurisdiction over redistricting. Id.
85. Baker, 369 U.S. at 210.
86. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. The Court's factors included:
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.
Id.
87. TRIBE, supra note 66, at 100-02. Justice Brennan continually underlined the concern that
the doctrine focus on separating the proper sphere of federal judicial power from the appropriate
spheres of federal executive and legislative power. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
88. See TRIBE, supra note 66, at 105 (discussing the use of political question doctrine as a
basis to hold an issue as non-justiciable); Barkow, supra note 66, at 268-73 (discussing the cases
involving political question doctrine following Baker); supra note 80 (listing a number of
Supreme Court cases involving the doctrine). But see Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 11 (1973)
(stating that simply "because this doctrine has been held inapplicable to certain carefully
delineated situations, it is no reason for federal courts to assume its demise"). Gilligan is one of
the only cases since Baker to invoke the political question doctrine and find the issue nonjusticiable. TRIBE, supra note 66, at 105.
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89
apportionment disputes.

C. The ReapportionmentRevolution
Once the Court entered the political thicket, it wasted no time in
making its mark. 9° The Court first developed the "one person, one
vote" standard requiring legislatures to create districts with equal
populations. 9 1 Even with the mathematical formula, the Court focused
on the qualitative idea of fair and effective representation. 92 As a result,

the jurisprudence continued to develop from the 93Voting Rights Acts of
1965 and a series of racial gerrymandering cases.
1. Entering the Political Thicket

While Baker is famous for establishing the factors which determine a
political question, the decision also established the Court's role in
apportionment controversies. 94 Previously, the Court refused to enter
the political thicket of apportionment, most notably in the case of
Colegrove v. Green.95 The Baker decision changed this direction. 96 In
Baker, Tennessee voters brought a claim alleging that the failure of the
Tennessee Assembly to readjust the electoral districts violated their

89. Dixon, One Man, One Vote, supra note 36, at 385.

90. See infra Part H.C. 1 (outlining the apportionment revolution).
91. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the one person, one vote standard).
92. See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing the search for fair and effective representation).
93. See infra Part II.C.4 (discussing the racial gerrymandering cases and the related
standards).
94. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); TRIBE, supra note 66, at 100 n.32 (deeming Baker
began the series of cases that "effectively restructured most of the nation's legislatures").
95. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). Justice Frankfurter writing for the Court
believed "[c]ourts ought not to enter this political thicket [of legislative apportionment]." Id. at
556. In Colegrove, Illinois' voters challenged the constitutionality of the state's apportionment of
congressional districts. Id. at 550. Colegrove was a professor of political science at
Northwestern University. BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 37, at 26. The professor contested the
population variances between the 7th district, where he resided and that included 914,000
citizens, and the neighboring 5th district, which had a population of 112,000. Id. The Court
asserted the issue beyond the scope of the judicial branch, squarely within the power of Congress
and affirmed the lower court by dismissing the suit. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556. Justice
Frankfurter viewed the right asserted as falling under Article IV, Section 4, the Guaranty Clause,
which made it a political question. CLAUDE, supra note 83, at 150; see RUSH, supra note 35, at
16-17 (arguing beyond the avoidance of the political thicket, the case dealt with several notions
about state power to administer elections, individual voting rights, and the power of a state to
form and redefine the boundaries of its districts). The Court used Colegrove to dismiss a number
of apportionment claims. CLAUDE, supra note 83, at 151; see, e.g., South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276
(1950) (confirming the Court's opinion that electoral issues, this one involving the county unit
system of voting in Georgia, to beyond the Court's jurisdiction).
96. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court decision of
Baker v. Carr,369 U.S. 186 (1962)).

20051

Uncertainty Maintained

1289

equal protection rights granted by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. 9 7 Since an alleged violation of the Equal
Protection Clause was the sole basis for the claim, the Court asserted

that the political question doctrine should not be invoked without first
making an inquiry into the precise facts and posture of the particular
case.9 8 However, the challenge on Fourteenth Amendment grounds was
not a new legal theory, and the Court before Baker had continually
Nevertheless, the Baker Court applied the newly
rejected it.99
developed factors to determine the existence of a political question, and
held that the issue of apportionment did not fall within the bounds of a
political question. 1°° By placing apportionment issues under the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court used the Fourteenth Amendment's
judicially manageable standards to determine the validity of the
claim.10 1 The application of the Fourteenth Amendment did not focus
97. Baker, 369 U.S. at 187-88. The appellants originally brought a narrow Fourteenth
Amendment claim based on the violation of the Tennessee Constitution, but the Court focused on
the amicus curiae brief of the Solicitor General, which presented a broader version of the
Fourteenth Amendment issue. Neal, supra note 83, at 195; see supra notes 81-86 and
accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court decision of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962)).
98. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; see CLAUDE, supra note 83, at 157.
99. See Neal, supra note 83, at 191 (providing details to earlier challenges to apportionment
under the Fourteenth Amendment); see, e.g., Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957) (refusing to
hear an apportionment challenge from Okalahoma based on political question doctrine); Kidd v.
McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956) (refusing to hear an apportionment challenge from Tennessee
based on political question doctrine); Anderson v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952) (refusing to hear
an apportionment challenge from California based on political question doctrine); Cox v. Peters,
342 U.S. 936 (1952) (refusing to hear an apportionment challenge from Georgia based on
political question doctrine); Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors, 339 U.S. 940 (1950) (refusing to
hear an apportionment challenge from Louisiana based on political question doctrine); South v
Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950) (refusing to exercise the courts equity powers in cases posing
political issues arising from a Georgia's geographical distribution of electoral strength among its
political subdivisions); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948) (challenging a statute
requiring a petition to form and to nominate candidates for a new political party be signed by at
least 25,000 qualified voters, and contain 200 signatures from each of at least 50 counties within
the state).
100. Baker, 369 U.S. at 226; see Neal, supra note 83, at 195-201 (providing an overview of
the six opinions filed in Baker); supra note 86 (discussing the six factors to determine a political
question). Justice Frankfurter dissented believing the Court's decision was "empty rhetoric,
sounding a word of promise to the ear, sure to be disappointing to the hope." Baker, 369 U.S. at
270 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Many commentators had the same worries as Justice
Frankfurter. Dixon, One Man, One Vote, supra note 36, at 32 (observing a "detailed judicial
policing of gerrymandering would be a Herculean task bordering on the impossible," but "there
can be no total sanctuaries in the political thicket, else unfairness will simply shift from one form
to another"); Neal, supra note 83, at 188 (observing the decision in Baker "start[ed] from
a... precarious base-a fragmented Court, an abrupt reversal of position, unexplored and
debatable substantive principles, and the contemplation of remedies as novel as they are drastic").
101. Baker, 369 U.S. at 226 ("Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well
developed and familiar.. ").The Fourteenth Amendment states in relevant part that "[n]o state
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on harm to the individual voter, but rather on the need for equality of
voting strength. 102

The decision in Baker began the so-called

apportionment revolution,03 in which redistricting became primarily
driven by legal decisions. 1
shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ushered in the modem era of Equal Protection jurisprudence.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 66, at 527; see Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)
(holding segregation is a deprivation of the Equal Protection of laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment). The Court has relied on the Equal Protection Clause as a significant provision in
the struggle to end invidious discrimination and preserve fundamental rights. CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 66, at 527. The basic question posed by the Equal Protection Clause is whether the
government's classification of a certain group is justified by a sufficiently related purpose. Id.
The sufficient justification depends on the type of discrimination employed by the government.
Id. at 528. The Court established three levels of scrutiny depending on the group affected by the
discrimination. Id. at 529. Discrimination based on race or national origin is subject to strict
scrutiny. Id. Strict scrutiny requires the government to show a compelling purpose for the
discrimination and it is unable to achieve its objective through any less discriminatory alternative.
Id; see Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (finding strict scrutiny "strict
in theory and fatal in fact"). Intermediate scrutiny focuses on discrimination based on gender.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 66, at 529. To be upheld, the law must be related to an important
government purpose, and the discrimination must have a substantial relationship to the end being
sought. Id.; see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (establishing intermediate
scrutiny for gender classifications). The final level of review is labeled the rational basis test.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 66, at 529. All laws not subject to strict or intermediate scrutiny are
subject to the rational basis test. Id. Under this test, a law will be upheld if it is rationally related
to a legitimate government purpose, and the means selected is a rational manner to accomplish
the end. Id. at 529-30.
102. Neal, supra note 83, at 209.
What is at stake in the reapportionment cases is not... an individual concern with
equality, the interest of man in being treated like fellow man. In this respect the cases
differ from those that have been the traditional concern of the Equal Protection Clause.
Denial, or dilution, of the vote of a particular racial group, for example, offends the
Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment not primarily if at all because it weakens the
legislative influence of the voter as an individual or even of all the affected class as a
group. Such discrimination harms the individual directly by singling him out for
different treatment on grounds that are offensive and that degrade him. No comparable
personal injustice or injury can be asserted by a... voter who enters the polling booth
knowing that his vote will weigh less than that of [another voter].
Id.; see CLAUDE, supra note 83, at 146 (finding the main concern with apportionment was the
wide population differences between the electoral districts). The under-representation this
created, especially in urban centers, undermined the credibility of fair and effective representation
while allowing legislatures to ignore the needs of these underrepresented voters. Id. at 148-49.
Distinctions between residents of a state on the basis of geographical location are not insulated
from the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 147.
103. BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 37, at 28 (noting after Baker the power to determine the
"broad approach to redistricting passed from Congress and the state legislatures to the courts").
Baker and its progeny reversed decades of court decisions that held redistricting beyond the
court's purview. GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATz, ELBRIDGE GERRY'S SALAMANDER:
THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 4 (2002). These
decisions did not just change the court's involvement, but sparked a massive wave of redistricting
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2. The Principle of One Person, One Vote
Baker opened the floodgates for judicial challenges

1291

to the

apportionment of state legislatures and federal congressional
districts. 104 These decisions led to the "one person, one vote" principle,
articulated in Wesberry v. Sanders10 5 and Reynolds v. Sims. 106 This
principle, based on the Equal Protection Clause, prohibited dilution of a
person's vote through the apportionment process.' 0 7 It required the
108
electoral districts of the state to include the same number of citizens.
in the 1960s. Id. See generally id. at 12-28 (discussing the impact on the apportionment
revolution on federal and state elections).
104. See TRIBE, supra note 66, at 1065 n. 12 (listing the apportionment cases before the Court
in 1964). The Court considered a number of apportionment cases in 1964. See, e.g., Lucas v.
Forty-Fourth Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (finding a violation of one
person, one vote standard even with a state wide referendum approving the districting plan);
Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) (finding legislative apportionment provisions of the
Delaware Constitution violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Davis
v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (finding Virginia apportionment plan that did not mandate that
either of the houses of the Virginia general assembly be apportioned sufficiently on a population
basis); Md. Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964) (applying equal
protection to both houses of a bicameral state legislature); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S.
633 (1964) (finding New York violated the Fourteenth Amendment in its apportionment of the
state legislative bodies).
105. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). Wesberry challenged the gross disparity in the
population of Georgia's congressional districts under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause. Id. The districts had not been reapportioned since 1931 and ranged from
272,154 in the northeastern rural 9th district to 823, 860 in the urban 5th district of Atlanta.
JIGSAW POLITICS, supra note 60, at 23. In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that
congressional districts must be substantially equal in population. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 8. The
Court based its decision on Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution. Id. Article I, Section 2 states
"that representatives shall be apportioned among the states according to their respective numbers
and be chosen by the people of the several states." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. For the Court, this
article meant that "as nearly as is practicable, one man's vote in a congressional election is to be
worth as much as another's." Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 8; see TRIBE, supra note 66, at 1063-66
(discussing the establishment of the one person, one vote standard).
106. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Reynolds dealt with an Alabama apportionment
plan for the state legislature. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 537. Based on Fourteenth Amendment
grounds, the Court affirmed that equal number of voters should elect equal numbers of
representatives. Id. at 560-61. The Court stated "achieving...fair and effective representation for
all citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative apportionment." Id. at 565-66. Even
though Wesberry or Reynolds were not the first to articulate the standard, the cases became the
most famous symbols of the standards. TRIBE, supra note 66, at 1063-66; see Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963) (holding for the first time that a unit-vote system in elections for a
single office in a single constituency contravened the Equal Protection Clause and equal
protection required a one person, one vote standard). Chief Justice Warren called Reynolds his
most important opinion. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 12, at 541.
107. BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 37, at 28. During the 1964 term, the Court invalidated
thirteen state legislative plans for having excessive population deviations. Id.; see TRIBE, supra
note 66, at 1068-71 (discussing the mathematical requirements of the one person, one vote
standard).
108. TRIBE, supra note 66, at 1071.
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The Court distinguished between congressional districts and state

legislative districts in determining the allowable

variations

of

populations between districts. 1°9 The establishment of one person, one
vote created the foundation for the judicially discoverable and
manageable standards used by courts in future cases. 1 10 The one
person, one vote principle dramatically corrected the deviations in
congressional districts, and nullified a majority of states' electoral
district maps.'
Congressional reaction was swift, but ultimately failed
112
to alter the one person, one vote standard established by the Court.
While the principle seemed to establish quantitative standards for
apportionment, the formula did not deal with any of the qualitative
113
issues of fair and effective representation.
3. Fair and Effective Representation
Even before the one person, one vote standard, the Supreme Court
recognized that fair and effective representation required more than just
equally weighted votes. 114 Groups of voters could not be excluded
109. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577-78 (allowing distinctions between Congressional and state
legislative representation). The Court placed a stringent requirement on deviations of populations
in congressional districts. JIGSAW POLITICS supra note 60, at 24. The Court struck down a
redistricting plan that allowed a variation of 3.1 percent between districts. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,
394 U.S. 526 (1969). The Court held minor deviations were permissible only when the state
provided substantial evidence that the variation was unavoidable. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 532.
However, the Court declared that there was no "fixed numerical or percentage population
variance small enough to be considered de minimis and to satisfy without question the as nearly
as equal practicable standard." Id. at 530.
110. JIGSAW POLITICS, supra note 60, at 25. However, a number of commentators believed
the one person, one vote actually increased the opportunity for gerrymandered districts. RUSH,
supra note 35, at 3.
111. JIGSAW POLITICS supra note 60, at 25. After the 1971-72 redistricting period based on
the 1970 census, 385 of the 435 congressional districts had less then one percent variance from
the state average district population. Id. In comparison, after the 1962 election, only nine
districts deviated less then one percent from the state average. Id.
112. See Dixon, One Man, One Vote, supra note 36, at 385-86 (outlining Congressional
response to the Court's apportionment revolution).
Over 130 resolutions and bills were
introduced in Congress aimed at restoring congressional jurisdiction over redistricting, delaying
or staying state compliance with the Court decisions or even proposing constitutional guidelines
for redistricting. BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 37, at 28. Senator Dirksen of Illinois introduced a
constitutional amendment that would have given states the power to apportion one house of the
state legislature on a non-population basis. Id.
113. TRIBE, supra note 66, at 1074. Even though Chief Justice Warren in Reynolds stated
"achieving.. .fair and effective representation for all citizens is ... the basic aim of legislative
apportionment," Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565-66, the Court did not provide guidance to the lower
courts beyond the mathematical requirement. TRIBE, supra note 66, at 1074.
114. See BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 37, at 33 (discussing fair representation goes beyond
mathematical equality); Singer, supra note 41, at 532 (discussing permissible waivers to the one
person, one vote); see also Dean Alfange, Jr., Gerrymandering and the Constitution: Into the
Thorns of Thicket at Last, in 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 175, 178 n.20 (1986) (discussing individual
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from influencing the government through tricks in the apportionment
process, such as the method used by the defendants in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot. 115 In Gomillion, the Alabama legislature redrew the city
boundaries of Tuskegee, effectively eliminating African-American
voters from the city. 1 The lower courts upheld the action based on
long established precedent of judicial deference to state governments
altering political boundaries."
The Supreme Court viewed the new
boundaries as an illegal method of minimizing the impact of a group of
voters' influence because the new boundaries did not conform to the
traditional districting principles. 1 18 The Court based its decision on the
Fifteenth rather than the Fourteenth
Amendment, thus avoiding the
119
broader issue of equal protection.
Even with the Gomillion decision and the creation of the one person,
one vote standard a few years later, questions remained as to theyproper
standard to be used in determining a valid apportionment. 12U For
example, in Wright v. Rockfeller,12 minority voters challenged

Justices views on gerrymandering included in Supreme Court decisions).
115. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
116. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340. The Court described the new boundaries as "an uncouth
twenty-eight-sided figure." Id. The creation of the new boundaries was in response to increased
African-American voter registration. Gordon E. Baker, Gerrymandering: Privileged Sanctuary
or Next Judicial Target?, in REAPPORTIONMENT INTHE 1970s 131 (Nelson W. Polsby ed., 1971)
[hereinafter Baker, Gerrymandering]. The new boundaries excluded all but four or five of the
four hundred African-American voters, but did not remove any of the white voters from the
Tuskegee. Id. at 131.
117. See Baker, Gerrymandering, supra note 116, at 131. (discussing earlier cases where
courts deferred to the legislature).
118. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347. The Court viewed the new city boundary has an attempt to
single out a racial minority for special discriminatory treatment. Id. at 346. Even though
reapportionment and the establishment of political boundaries is traditionally a role for legislative
branch, the discriminatory nature of the defendants removed the judicial deference. Id. at 34647. The Court wrote "[a]cts generally lawful may become unlawful when done to accomplish an
unlawful end." Id. at 347.
119. Baker, Gerrymandering,supra note 116, at 131. By avoiding Equal Protection issues, it
seemed the majority wanted to avoid undermining the holding of Colegrove, but still strike down
a clear instance of racial discrimination. Id. Justice Frankfurter claimed Gomillion was not "an
ordinary geographic redistricting measure even within familiar abuses of gerrymandering."
Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341. However, Justice Whittaker argued that the case was better decided
under Equal Protection than the Fifteenth Amendment since the right to vote was not denied, but
simply the right to vote in Tuskegee. Id. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring). The Fifteenth
Amendment mandates "the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." U.S. CONST. amend XV, § 1; see RUSH, supra note 35, at 18-21 (questioning the
Court's logic of finding a right to vote violation).
120. TRIBE, supra note 66, at 1074; see Singer, supra note 41, at 533 (discussing the judicial
landscape after Gomillion).
121. Wright v. Rockfeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
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Manhattan's four congressional districts, stating that the districts were
racially gerrymandered to segregate minority voters. 122

The Court

simply assumed justiciability and proceeded to a resolution on the
merits, finding that the plan did not violate the minority voters'
at the
constitutional rights. 123 However, Wright received little attention
124
day.
same
the
on
Wesberry
released
Court
the
because
time
To resolve these questions, Congress attempted to assist the Court by
passing the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 125 As originally passed, the
Voting Rights Act sought to suspend the use of certain tests and devices
that historically frustrated African-Americans from exercising their
Fifteenth Amendment rights. 126 For example, section 5 of the Act
attempted to limit the ability of certain states to establish new obstacles

for minorities to achieve fair representation in the redistricting
process.127 Moreover, section 5 specifically related to the issue of racial
gerrymandering by placing limits on28the states' ability to redistrict
without federal government approval. 1
After the enactment of the Voting Rights Act, the Court refocused on
other procedures that might violate constitutional standards. 12 9 In
122. Id. at 53. The voters based the claims on the Fifteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
123. Id.; Clinton, supra note 38, at 11 (discussing the Wright decision). By affirming the
district court's findings on a failure of proof instead of non-justiciability grounds, the Court
implicitly accepted racial gerrymandering claims were a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
124. Clinton, supra note 38, at 12; see supra note 105 (discussing the Supreme Court decision
of Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)).
125. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 USC § 1973 (2000).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 1973. Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to
the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative History, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, reprinted in
CONTROVERSIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: COLLECTIONS OF DOCUMENTS AND ARTICLES ON
MAJOR QUESTIONS OF AMERICAN LAW, 243 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2001). The Act eliminated the
use of such tests or devices in states and counties. Id. See generally MAURICE T. CUNNINGHAM,
MAXIMIZATION, WHATEVER THE COST: RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE (2001) (reviewing the role of the Department of Justice and specifically, the Civil Rights
Division in enforcing the Act).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Section 5 applies to the entire states of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia and parts of California,
Florida, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota. 42 USC §
1973.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1965). Section 5 requires States to obtain pre-clearance from the
Attorney General of the United States or from the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia for any change in a "standard, practice or procedure with respect to voting." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c. To obtain pre-clearance, the State must prove that the new redistricting plan "does not
have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account
of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. See J. Gerald Hebert et al., THE REALISTS' GUIDE TO
REDISTRICTING, 2000 A.B.A. SEC. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY PRACTICE 59-65
(providing an overview of Section 5 and the procedures for pre-clearance).
129. See TRIBE, supra note 66, at 1077 (discussing Court decisions after passage of the Voting

2005]

Uncertainty Maintained

1295

Whitcomb v. Chavis,130 the Court evaluated multi-member districts and
determined that they were not automatically discriminatory against
minorities. 13 1 Moving beyond the one person, one vote standard, in
White v. Regester, 132 the Court declared a legislative districting plan

unconstitutional, despite the fact that the districts were equally
populated. 133 However, the Court remained unclear as to the specific
34
level of proof necessary to show an unconstitutional districting plan. 1
of
Consequently, a series of lower court challenges and the retirement 135
some Justices eventually led to the decision of Mobile v. Bolden.
The Bolden Court dismissed a challenge to the Mobile, Alabama atlarge election system, which elected the members of the city
commission. 136 Despite the fact that African-Americans composed
roughly thirty-five percent of the population, no African-American had
ever been elected commissioner. 13 7 The voters argued that they were
being denied equal access to the local political system and requested the
court institute a single-member district system. 13 8 In short, the Court

Rights Acts); see, e.g., Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 438 (1965) & Bums v. Richardson, 384
U.S. 73, 88 (1965) (finding multimember districts valid under one person, one vote as long as the
district did not "operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political
elements of the voting population"). The Burns and Fortson opinions seemed to suggest that the
Fourteenth Amendment provided protection against political discrimination; however, the lower
courts did not take the suggestion. See Clinton, supra note 38, at 17 (discussing lower court
decisions avoiding issues of partisan gerrymandering after Burns and Fortson); e.g., City of
Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 410 U.S. 962 (1973)
(affirming summarily a district court decision that at-large elections for city council held after the
expansion of the city's corporate boundaries to include more white areas, thereby giving white
voters a majority in the city, diluted black voters and violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
130. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
131. Id. (asserting multi-member state legislative districts were not per se unconstitutional).
Whitcomb dealt with a challenge by black voters against the design on the multi-member
legislative district around Indianapolis, Indiana. Id. at 128-29; see Clinton, supra note 38, at 19
(arguing the Court and many commentators failed to comprehend the gerrymander aspect of the
case and instead treated it as another challenge to multimember districts).
132. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1972).
133. Id. at 763-74 (striking down a multi-member district plan on Fourteenth Amendment
grounds). The Court determined that the multi-member districts complied with the one person,
one vote requirement. Id. However, the history of discrimination related to the multi-member
districts, which provided less opportunity for minorities to participate in the electoral process,
made the district unconstitutional. Id. at 767-79.
134. TRIBE, supra note 66, at 1078 (discussing the impact of the Whitcomb and White
decisions on developing levels proof required in apportionment cases).
135. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). Richard L. Engstrom, Racial Vote Dilution: The
Concept and the Court, in THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS 25
(Lore S. Foster ed., 1985) [hereinafter Engstrom, Racial Vote Dilution].
136. Engstrom, Racial Vote Dilution, supra note 135, at 27.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 26.
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ruled in favor of the current at-large
system because the voters failed to
139
show intentional discrimination.
Importantly, the Bolden Court shifted the burden of proof to the
challengers of the alleged discriminatory behavior and required them to
show both discriminatory effect and intent. 140 In response, Congress
amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and restored the burden 14of1
proof standard used by many lower courts prior to Bolden.
Furthermore, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act to prohibit
election laws that unintentionally minimized minority voters'
influence. 142 Before the amendment, section 2 was a general statutory
prohibition against any racially based interference with the right to
vote. 143 The newly amended section prohibited minority vote dilution
and allowed a showing of discriminatory effect to be sufficient to prove

139. Id. at 29.
140. TRIBE, supra note 66, at 1078-79. The Court had recently altered its approach to the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Engstrom, Racial Vote Dilution, supra note
135, at 27. The Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), held discriminatory
treatment alone does not establish a sufficient presumption of unconstitutionality to require that
such treatment be scrutinized strictly by the judiciary. Engstrom, Racial Vote Dilution, supra
note 135, at 27. The Court determined disproportionate impact can be cited as evidence
supporting an inference of a discriminatory intent, but that alone is not a sufficient condition for
such an inference. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242. In relation to apportionment cases, the Supreme Court
cited Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 84 (1964) as supporting this new standard, but did not
reference Whitcomb or White in which findings concerning racial motivation were never
expressed. Davis, 426 U.S. at 24 (1976). In Wright, the Court dismissed the claim for a failure to
show that the legislature was motivated by racial considerations. Wright, 376 U.S. at 84. The
plurality opinion in Bolden explicitly held that the Davis intent standard applied to vote dilution
cases. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 67 (finding the intent requirement clearly "applied to claims of racial
discrimination affecting voting just as it does to other claims of racial discrimination").
141. Lewyn, supra note 35, at 412 n.64 (1993). The congressional intent in adopting the
revision to section 2 was explicit. Engstrom, Racial Vote Dilution, supra note 135, at 35. It was
"to restore the legal standard that governed voting discrimination cases prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Bolden." SENATE COMMr-rEE ON THE JUDICIARY, VOTING RIGHTS ACT
EXTENSION, S. REP. No. 97-417, pt. 6, at 16 (1982). In fact, the Whitcomb-White participation
standard was codified by the following addition to Section 2:
A violation is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the
political processes leading to nomination or election... are not equally open... in that
[blacks] have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)). See generally Hebert, supra note 128, at 14-20 (providing
an overview of Section 2).
142. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. at 134.
143. Engstrom, Racial Vote Dilution, supra note 135, at 34. It read "no voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State
or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race and color." Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110 § 2, 79 Stat. 437, as
enacted, 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
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44

discrimination in redistricting. 1
Following this amendment, the Court established a legal standard for
145
The chief
adjudicating section 2 claims in Thornberg v. Gingles.
question facing the Court in Gingles was whether the provisions
contained in section 2 of the Voting Rights Act made multi-member
voters. 14 6
districts per se discriminatory against African-American

While not finding multi-member districts automatically in violation of
section 2, the Court established a three-prong test to determine if a

specific multi-member district violated section 2.147 The three-prong
test required a showing that: (1) the minority group was "sufficiently
large and geographically compact" to constitute a majority in a

differently drawn single member district; (2) the minority group was a
"politically cohesive" group; and (3) the white majority voted together,
which enabled it, in the absence of special circumstances, to usually
defeat the minority's preferred candidate. 14 8 The test in Gingles was
later expanded to single-member districts. 149 The decision affirmed
Congressional desire to overturn Bolden and eliminated intent as a

criterion for showing section 2 violations. 150 It also created a change in
how

state

legislatures

viewed

racial

gerrymandering.

15 1

The

144. TRIBE, supra note 66, at 1078. The amended section 2 reads:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race or color.
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. at 134 (amending 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (1965)) (emphasis added).
145. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); Hebert, supra note 128, at 14-20 (discussing
the aftermath of Gingles and the effect of the three prong test on section 2 litigation); Marsha J.
Tyson Darling, Volume Introduction to CONTROVERSIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
COLLECTIONS OF DOCUMENTS AND ARTICLES ON MAJOR QUESTIONS OF AMERICAN LAW Xi,
xvii (Paul Finkelman, ed., 2001). The Court decided Gingles and Bandemer on the same day.
Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 12, at 550.
146. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48-49 (examining the creation of six multi-member districts in
North Carolina).
147. Id. at 48 (finding multi-member districts "generally will not impeded the ability of
minority voters to elect representatives of their choice"); see SCHER ET AL., supra note 37, at
76-85 (discussing the three prong test and effects Gingles had on section 2 litigation).
148. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51.
149. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40 (1993) (holding that it would be illogical to
require a challenger of a multi-member district to a higher standard of proof then a challenger to a
single-member district).
150. SCHER ET AL., supra note 37, at 79. Regardless of the legislature's goal, Gingles
dictates that if the district boundaries dilutes the voting strength of minorities then it constituted a
violation of section 2 as well as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. MARK MONMONIER,
BUSHMANDERS & BULLWINKLES, 25 (2001); see supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text
(discussing the Supreme Court decision of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980)).
151. See MONMONIER, supra note 150, at 25 (viewing Gingles as requiring legislatures to
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amendment to section 2 appeared to require states to 15create
districts that
2
would enhance the voting power of racial minorities.

4. Benign Racial Gerrymandering
In the aftermath of Gingles and following the 1990 census, state
legislatures began to use racial gerrymandering to benefit racial
minorities. 15 3 The Supreme Court first tackled this issue in Shaw v.
Reno. 15 4 In Shaw, a group of white voters in North Carolina brought
suit against the U.S. Attorney General, who pre-cleared the state's

redistricting plan that included two minority-majority districts. 155 The
white voters alleged that the district boundaries created an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander. 15 6 The Court focused on the
bizarre shape of the district and determined that the shape of the district
had no other purpose than to link voters on the basis of race. 157 The
Shaw Court restricted the use of affirmative racial gerrymandering

aimed at increasing the power of racial minorities. 158 However, while
the Court refused to find redistricting based on race as a per se
violation, the state's plan did subject it to strict scrutiny, 159 and the
create minority-majority districts if the three-prong test is satisfied since failure would allow the
federal judiciary to create such districts); see also Marsha J. Tyson Darling, Volume Introduction
to CONTROVERSIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: COLLECTIONS OF DOCUMENTS AND ARTICLES ON
MAJOR QUESTIONS OF AMERICAN LAW xi, xvii-xviii (Paul Finkelman, ed., 2001) (determining
that Gingles was "in large part responsible for intensifying the pressure toward creating minority
single-member voting districts, because it provided specific criteria to be considered in the
creation of a minority legislative district").
152. Hebert, supra note 128, at 14-20; Engstrom, Racial Vote Dilution, supra note 135, at 35.
153. Redistricting Task Force, supra note 40. After the census, the Justice Department
refused to approve initial redistricting plans because alternative proposals existed that provided
additional minority districts. Id. In response, many state legislatures attempted to maximize the
number of minority districts. Id.
154. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)
155. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 630. The Attorney General approved the districting plan as required
by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. SCHER, supra note 37, at 85; see supra note 125-26 and
accompanying text (discussing section 5 of the Voting Rights Act). The Twelfth district cut
diagonally across the state, following Interstate 85 and at times was no wider then the right of
way. SCHER ET AL., supra note 37, at 93.
156. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 633-34.
157. Id. at 644-47 (finding "appearances do matter"). The Court stated that a regular shape is
not constitutionally required. Hebert et al., supra note 128, at 52.
158. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657. Concerned racial gerrymandering may "balkanize" voters into
competing racial factions Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, deemed race-based districting,
even if created for remedial purposes, subject to strict scrutiny. Id. Justice O'Connor worried
that districts based on race would have a socially divisive impact on votes resembling "political
apartheid." Id. at 647. According to the majority, racially motivated districts send the wrong
message to elected officials suggesting their primary obligation is to represent only the members
of the racially-dominated group rather than the whole constituency. Id. at 648.
159. Id. at 642 ("This Court never has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking is
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160
Court remanded the case to the district court.

After Shaw, the Court continued to refine the judicial standards in

adjudicating racial gerrymandering disputes. 16 1 The Court in Miller v.
Johnson reaffirmed that race may be a criterion in congressional
16 2
Miller
districting, but only under conditions of strict scrutiny.
that
plan
redistricting
involved a challenge to a Georgia congressional
163
The Court established that
created two minority-majority districts.
the bizarre appearance of an electoral district is not a necessary

condition for a constitutional violation. 164 Miller required a showing

impermissible in all circumstances.") The Supreme Court held that racial classifications will be
allowed only if the government can meet the heavy burden of demonstrating that the
discrimination is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose. Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986). Under strict scrutiny, the government must show an
important reason for its action and must demonstrate that the goal cannot be achieved through any
less discriminatory means. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280 n.6; see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 66, at
668. However, the Court had previously held that districts created to enhance minority
representation were valid even though the state "deliberately used race in a purposeful manner" to
create minority-majority districts. United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165
(1977) [hereinafter referred to as "UJO"]. The majority in Shaw attempted to circumvent the
holding in UJO. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 651. Justice O'Connor distinguished UJO by claiming Shaw
did not involve a vote dilution claim. Id. The Court faced a balance between the idea that no
state shall purposefully discriminate against any individual on the basis or race and members of a
minority group should be free from discrimination in the electoral process. DAVID T. CANON,
RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION 78 (1999); see supra notes 101 & 159 (discussing
the levels of scrutiny applied by courts based on the government's classification of groups).
160. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 658. The Supreme Court actually revisited the Shaw case three more
times before it was ultimately resolved. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001) (reversing
a district court decision that found the redistricting plan invalid because the district court viewed
the plan as predominately based on racial consideration); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999)
(reversing a district court decision that granted legislature's motion for summary judgment
against a change to a new redistricting plan created after Shaw); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899
(1996) (reversing a district court decision that found the redistricting plan valid after being
remained by the Court in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630).
161. See United States v. Hayes, 515 U.S. 737 (1995) (holding that a plaintiff challenging the
constitutionality of a redistricting plan must have proper standing). The Court determined the
"special representational harms can cause racial classifications in the voting context" only fall on
the voter in the specific district being challenged. Id. at 745. A person in another district "does
not suffer these special harms." Id.
162. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
163. Id. at 913. The issue was whether the district was the result of race-based districting,
which could be demonstrated through shapes, demographics and other evidence. Id.
164. Id. at 917. So long as a district is not drawn for impermissible reasons, a district may
take any shape, even a bizarre one. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 999 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (finding it not necessary for districts to pass "beauty contest in order to be
constitutionally valid); see also Brooke Erin Moore, Opening the Door to Single Government:
The 2002 Maryland RedistrictingDecision Gives the Courts too Much Power in an Historically
Political Arena, 33 U. BALT. L. REV. 123 (2003) (providing an overview of the Vera decision).
However, it seems that shape still plays an important role since the only two districts to survive a
Shaw challenge were relatively compact. Hebert et al., supra note 128, at 53; e.g., Lawyer v.
Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 575 (1997) (finding Florida's Senate District 21 as "demonstrably
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that race was the predominant factor in the creation of the electoral
district. 165 If this burden is met, courts will apply strict scrutiny to
determine if the state had a compelling governmental interest in creating
the specific district and whether the district was narrowly tailored to

achieve that interest. 166 The Court's recent decisions demonstrate that
the determination of whether race predominated as the motivation in the
creation of districts will require fact intensive analysis focusing on
167
traditional districting principles.
D. Applying the Lessons Learned to PartisanGerrymandering
Even though the Court established standards of review for racial
gerrymandering, the Court remained silent as to the issue of political
benign and satisfactorily tidy"); DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409, 1413-15 (E.D. Cal. 1994)
(three-judge court), summarily affid in relevant part, 515 U.S. 1170 (1995) (finding the
California districting plan incorporated "[n]o bizarre boundaries").
165. Miller, 515 U.S. at 916. The Court determined the burden required was a
show[ing], either through circumstantial evidence of a district's shape and
demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the
predominate factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number
of voters within or without a particular district. To make this showing, a plaintiff must
prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles,
including, but not limited to compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions
or communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations. Where
these or other race-neutral considerations are the basis for redistricting legislation, and
are not subordinated to race, a State can defeat a claim that a district had been
gerrymandered on racial lines.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
166. Redistricting Task Force, supra note 40. Compliance with section 5 is not a judicially
significant reason for creating minority-majority districts. CANON, supra note 159, at 80; e.g.,
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997) (upholding the dismantling of two black majority districts
in Georgia even though the legislature had shown a clear preference for keeping one of those two
districts during the redistricting process); Vera, 517 U.S. at 972 (holding that protecting
incumbents was a not a strong enough reason for the redistricting plan when race was viewed as
the predominate factor); see also supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the search for fair and effective
representation); supra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing the levels of scrutiny applied
by courts based on the government's classification of groups).
167. Richard L. Engstrom, The Political Thicket, Electoral Refonn, and Minority Voting
Rights, in FAIR AND EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION? 19 (Mark E. Rush & Richard L. Engstrom
ed., 2001) [hereinafter Engstrom, Political Thicket]. The four traditional districting principles
identified in Shaw & Miller include contiguity, compactness, respect for political subdivisions,
and recognition of communities of interest. Id.Courts also rely on certain types of evidence such
as district shape and demographics, statements made by legislators and their staff, and the nature
of the data used in the districting process. Hebert et al., supra note 128, at 51. These principles
will serve as "a crucial frame of reference" in evaluating districts. Miller, 515 U.S. at 928
(O'Connor, J., concurring); cf. Engstrom, Political Thicket, supra at 20-30 (discussing the
ambiguity of using traditional districting principles as constitutional principles to determine
illegal gerrymandering); CANON, supra note 159, at 79 (arguing the Court's new analysis under
Equal Protection that emphasizes traditional districting principles will cause greater confusion
then the one person, one vote or voter dilution standards).
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gerrymandering. 16 8 At first, the Court avoided trying to distinguish
between districts created with politics in mind and districts created
solely for partisan political gain.169 Going forward, the Court began to
talk about the possibility of dealing with partisan gerrymanders, but
continued to invoke the one person, one vote standard to strike down
redistricting plans viewed as violating fair and effective

representation. 170
1. The First Attempt
The first Supreme Court case directly dealing with partisan
gerrymandering was Gaffney v. Cummings. 17 1 The challenge involved a
1972 Connecticut reapportionment plan for the state legislature.172 A
bipartisan apportionment board created the plan designed to insure that
each party's strength in the legislature was roughly proportional to its
statewide voting strength. 17 3 The Court upheld the plan and noted that
political considerations were always part of a redistricting plan. 174 The
Court held that a redistricting plan that included political factors was not
automatically unconstitutional. 17 5 However, the Court did hint that
plans, which unduly discriminated against political groups, might be

unconstitutional. 176

168. TRIBE, supra note 66, at 1080. The Court did make a distinction for bipartisan
gerrymandering plans designed to protect incumbents; see, e.g., Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S.
73, 89 n.16 (1966) (holding that drawing lines to minimize contests between sitting incumbents
did not in and of itself establish "invidiousness").
169. See infra Part II.D.1 (discussing the Court's first attempt to deal with partisan
gerrymandering).
170. See infra Part ll.D.2 (discussing the Court's second attempt to deal with partisan
gerrymandering).
171. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973)
172. Id. at 752. The plan developed by an apparently bipartisan commission had "the
conscious intent to create a districting plan that would achieve a rough approximation of the
statewide political strengths of the Democratic and Republican Parties." Id.
173. Id. The districting plan deliberately ignored traditional districting principles, sometimes
totally disregarding political boundary lines. Alfange, supra note 114, at 205. The plan focused
on the preservation of incumbents and necessitated a political judgment as to the effect a
particular district would have on the political welfare of the political parties. Gaffney, 412 U.S. at
752; Alfange, supra note 114, at 205.
174. Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 752-54; see Carl A. Auerbach, The Supreme Court and
Reapportionment, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970S 74, 77 (Nelson W. Polsby, ed., 1971)
("Direct representation of group or interest is undesirable in a democracy. The values sought by
such representation are inconsistent with those promoted by geographic districting.").
175. Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 752-54; Alfange, supra note 114, at 205.
176. Gafffney, 412 U.S. at 754. The Court recalled earlier decisions that held districts might be
vulnerable to the Fourteenth Amendment if racial or political groups had been "fenced out of the
political process" and their voting strength diluted. Id. However, the Court refused to attempt the
"impossible task of extirpating politics from what are the essentially political processes of the

1302

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 36

2. Second Time Around
The 1980 census provided the next opportunity for the Court to
weigh in on partisan gerrymandering. 177 The incumbent Republican
members of Congress from New Jersey challenged the newly adopted
Congressional redistricting plan as a violation of Article I, section 2 of
the United States Constitution in Karcher v. Daggett. 178 The New
Jersey plan included a variation of 0.69 percent between the most
populated and the least populated district. 179 The majority of the Court
affirmed the lower court decision that invalidated the plan under the
Reynolds' standard of one person, one vote because the variations were
avoidable. 18
The Court did not specifically decide the issue on
qualitative ideas of fair and effective representation, but the Justices
expanded fair and effective representation beyond the quantitative
aspect of numerical equality. 18 1 Every opinion written in Karcher
addressed the issue of partisan gerrymandering. 182 The four dissenters
went so far as to find that partisan gerrymandering might impose a
greater threat to Equal Protection than electoral districts of unequal
population. 183 Justice Stevens argued that vote dilution included
sovereign states." Id. The Court conceded that the focus on precise mathematical equality to the
exclusion of all other considerations opened the way for the denial of fair and effective
representation by other means. Id. at 749. However, the Court implicitly noted that political
gerrymandering was beyond the control of the courts, and that, while the court should avoid the
adopting constitutional standards that would encourage it, they could do little to prevent it. Id. at
754; Alfange, supra note 114, at 205.
177. Singer, supra note 41, at 535; see TRIBE, supra note 66, at 1070, 1074 (discussing the
Supreme Court cases arising from the 1980 census).
178. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983). Based on the 1980 census, New Jersey lost
one seat in the U.S. House of Representatives. Id. at 727. Article I, section 2 states "that
representatives shall be apportioned among the states according to their respective numbers and
be chosen by the people of the several states. U.S. CONST, Art. I, § 2.
179. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 728. The plan included 14 districts with an average population of
526,059. Id. The largest district had a population of 527,472 while the smallest had a population
of 523,798. Id. at 727. This created a deviation of 0.6984%. Id. The New Jersey legislature had
considered a plan with a deviation of 0.4514%. Id. at 729.
180. Id. at 738. The Court held the difference between the districts "could have been avoided
or significantly reduced with a good-faith effort to achieve population equality." Id.; see JIGSAW
POLMCS: supra note 60, at 26 (discussing the Court decision in Karcher).
181. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 765 (Stevens, J., concurring); see id. at 781 (White, J., dissenting)
(suggesting an overemphasis on numerical formulas may distort the "fair and effective
representation of all citizens"); Id. at 787-88 (Powell, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that
gerrymandering presents a threat to the legislative process that may not be remedied by adherence
to quantitative figures).
182. Alfange, supra note 114, at 210 (reviewing the opinions of the Justices in Karcher).
183. Karcher,462 U.S. at 765-84 (White, J., dissenting).
Although nether a rule of absolute equality or nor one of substantial equality can alone
prevent deliberate partisan gerrymandering, the former offers legislators a ready
justification for disregarding geographical and political boundaries.... Legislatures
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partisan gerrymandering and therefore violated the Equal Protection
He argued that simply complying with the one person, one
Clause.
vote standard did not automatically create a constitutionally valid
redistricting plan. 185 Justice Stevens reaffirmed the imperative of

population equality, but believed it should be supplemented with
the Court's focus
additional criteria. 186 The Karcher decision shifted 187
gerrymandering.
partisan
of
issue
qualitative
onto the
E. PartisanGerrymanderingin Davis v. Bandemer
The decision in Davis v. Bandemer suggested the coming of a second
reapportionment revolution. 188 Bandemer established a formal judicial
role in partisan gerrymandering disputes. 189 However, the Justices
failed to provide a clear standard to the lower courts when dealing with

these issues. 190

1. Justiciability Declared
The Court squarely focused and arranged the discussion around the
issue of unconstitutional politically gerrymandered districts in Davis v.
intent on minimizing the representation of selected political or racial groups are invited
to ignore political boundaries and compact districts so long as they adhere to
population equality among districts using standards which we know and they know are
sometimes quite incorrect.
Id. at 776 (White, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted). Justice Powell's separate dissent
went further by stating redistricting plans that were predominately based on political
considerations might be unconstitutional. Id. at 787-88 (Powell, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 744 (Stevens, J., concurring). However, due to a deficient record, Justice Stevens
refused to conclude with certainty that the plan was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.
Id. at 765 (Stevens, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 749 (Stevens, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 751 (Stevens, J., concurring).
In evaluating equal protection challenges to districting plans, just as in resolving such
attacks on other forms of discriminatory action, I would consider whether the plan has
a significant adverse impact on an identifiable political group, whether the plan has
objective indicia or irregularity, and then, whether the State is able to produce
convincing evidence that the plan nevertheless serves neutral, legitimate interests of the
community as a whole.
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
187. See Singer, supra note 41, at 537 (discussing the inability to explain Karcher on simple
quantitative terms).
188. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); RUSH, supra note 35, at 3 ("The decision
constituted a significant change in the Court's behavior, opening new avenues of adjudication and
case law."); see supra, Part II.C.1 (discussing the first reapportionment revolution ignited by
Baker).
189. See infra Part E.1 (discussing the Court's decions in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109
(1986)).
190. BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 37, at 35 (discussing the various interpretations of the
standards established in Bandemer).
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Bandemer.19 1
In that case, Indiana Democrats challenged a
reapportionment
plan
passed
by
the Republican-dominated
legislature. 192 The district court found the reapportionment plan to be
unconstitutional because it deprived the state's Democrats of their
rightful share of voting power. 193 The lower court used Justice
194
Stevens's concurrence in Karcher as the basis for its opinion.
However, the lower
court never discussed the justiciability of partisan
95
1
gerrymanders.
While the parties in Bandemer did not originally raise the issue of
justiciability, the Supreme Court raised the issue in the appeal and
196
determined the justiciability of political gerrymandering claims.
Once the Court determined that none of the identifying factors under
Baker existed in Bandemer, a six-Justice majority promptly pronounced
that claims of partisan gerrymandering were justiciable. 19 " In addition
191. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109.
192. id. at 115 (plurality opinion). Following the 1980 federal census, the Indiana General
Assembly, as required by state law, began the process of reapportioning the State's legislative
districts. Id. at 113. The final plan passed in both Republican controlled Houses along party lines
and was signed by the Republican Governor. Id. at 114 n.2. The complaint contended the district
boundaries and the mix of single-member and multi-member districts in the approved plan
constituted a partisan gerrymander intended to disadvantage Democrats. Id. at 115; see Alfange,
supra note 114, at 231-35 (providing a sketch of the 1981 Indiana reapportionment process).
193. Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1491 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (affirming the right of fair
and effective representation).
A scheme designed to insure a predestined outcome does not accord to a vote cast that
equality in elective power to which it is guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Each citizen has a right not only to cast a ballot, but to have his political decision be as
meaningful as any other vote. Thus political gerrymandering is a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause because it invidiously discriminates against a cognizable,
identifiable group of voters.
Id. at 1492.
194. Id. at 1490; see supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stevens's
concurring opinion in Karcher).
195. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 118.
196. Id. at 118-27. The defendants were the first to raise the issue on appeal. Id. at 118.
197. Id. at 127. The six Justice majority for justiciability included Justices White, Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, Powell and Stevens. Id. at 113, 161 (plurality opinion). The majority
opinion, written by Justice White, based their conclusion of justiciability on Gaffney and
"repeated reference in other opinions" that found plans that dilute the vote of political groups to
be constitutional suspect. Id. at 119-20; see Part II.D.1 (discussing Gaffney). Justice White's
opinion reviewed the factors established in Baker to the facts in the instant case and found none
of them applied. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 122; see supra note 86 (discussing the factors of Baker
v. Carr). Justice White noted Baker did not immediately establish a clear judicially manageable
standard for apportionment cases. Bandemer. 478 U.S. at 123. However, subsequent Supreme
Court cases, specifically Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), did clarify such standards.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 123. Justice White concluded the inability to instantaneously perceive an
"arithmetic presumption" like the "one person, one vote" standard did not oblige the Court to
determine partisan gerrymandering claims non-justiciable. Id.; see Alfange, supra note 114, at
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to Baker, the Court found earlier Supreme Court decisions involving

apportionment provided support for determining whether partisan
gerrymandering claims were justiciable. 19 8 The remaining three
Justices argued that the Equal Protection Clause did not supply a

judicially

manageable

standard

for

resolving

purely

political

gerrymandering claims. 199 The Justices in the minority argued that
resolving partisan gerrymandering disputes would require the Court to
impose proportional representation. 2°° - Regardless of the justiciability
found the Indiana plan constitutional, but used
issue, seven Justices20 still
1
different rationales.
237 (highlighting the fact that the Court had "hesitated to take the step for nearly a quarter of a
century after Baker and that half of the members of the majority had expressed an unwillingness
to take it scarcely more then two years earlier").
198. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 123-25. Justice White analyzed the justiciability of racial
gerrymander cases such as White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1972), and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403

U.S. 124 (1971), to demonstrate the justiciability of political gerrymandering cases. Bandemer,
478 U.S. at 124-25. In terms of justiciability, Justice White did not see a distinction between
racial and partisan gerrymandering claims. Id. at 125. Justice White reaffirmed the idea of fair
and effective representation established in Reynolds. Id. at 123-25; see Alfange, supra note 114,
at 237 (asserting at its base, the one person, one vote rule is an anti-gerrymandering rule).
199. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 144 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, wrote a concurring opinion finding partisan
gerrymandering covered by the political question doctrine. Id. Justice O'Connor viewed
apportionment as a straightforward political issue and, therefore, challenges to apportionment
plans represented a political question "in the truest sense of the term." Id. at 145. Finding
partisan gerrymandering as justiciable could only lead to "political instability and judicial
malaise." Id. at 147. Justice O'Connor viewed partisan gerrymandering as a "self-limiting
enterprise" that could be limited by the voters or the political parties. Id. at 152; see Alfange,
supra note 114, at 238-43 (discussing Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion regarding the claim
of justiciability).
200. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 156-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor feared the
Equal Protection clause would require legislative districts to be drawn in a manner that would
approximate equivalence under a vote-to-seat ratio. Id. at 156-57. This would require each party
having the same percentage of seats in the legislature as the percentage of votes it receives in the
legislative election statewide. Id at 156-57. The majority denied a preference for proportionality
per se, but simply a preference for parity between votes and representation sufficient to insure fair
and effective representation. Id. at 126 n.9; see Patrick Mulvaney, Not Quite an Exact Portrait,
THE NATION, Oct. 28, 2004 available at http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20041115&c=
1&s=mulvaney (discussing proportional representation).
201. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist, wrote a concurring opinion supporting the reversal of the district court based on the
political question doctrine. Id. at 144 (O'Connor J., concurring). The six Justices who found
partisan gerrymandering a justiciable question split as to the outcome of the case. Id. at 113
(plurality opinion). Justice Powell and Justice Stevens urged affirming the district court finding
that the redistricting plan was unconstitutional. Id. at 161-85 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun viewed the plan as
constitutional. Id. at 127 (plurality opinion). Even though those four Justices disagreed as to the
reasoning, they joined Chief Justice Burger and Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist to form a
majority for dismissal. Id. at 113; see Lewyn, supra note 35, at 407 (discussing the Justices'
rational in Bandemer).
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2. The Standards of Bandemer

Even though a majority determined the claim in Bandemer
justiciable, the Court failed to agree on a majority standard for courts to
apply when deciding political gerrymandering claims. 20 2 A plurality of
four Justices argued for a standard that required plaintiffs to prove

intentional discrimination against a political group as well as a
discriminatory effect on that group.20 3 Justice White, writing for the
plurality, did not consider the showing of the intent prong a difficult one
because districting involves political considerations. 204 However, the
effects prong required a showing that the group had been repeatedly
denied the opportunity to affect the political process. 2° 5
This
requirement went beyond showing that the results of an election were
not proportional to the relative strength of the parties. 206 In order to

show an unconstitutional gerrymander, a group of like-minded voters
would need to show an inability to convert their majorit numbers into
an electoral victory over a number of election cycles. 207 The plurality
required a showing of discriminatory effect even if the group had

established discriminatory intent.20 8
In his dissent, Justice Powell took a different approach than Justice
White in establishing standards. 20 9 Justice Powell agreed with the
plurality that discriminatory intent and effect must be shown, but

202. Singer, supra note 41, at 541. The six Justices in the majority for justiciability split into
two camps in deciding the appropriate standard. Id. Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun argued for one standard while Justices Powell and Stevens argued for another standard.
Id.
203. Alfange, supra note 114, at 243-44.
204. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 129 (plurality opinion) ("As long as redistricting is done by a
legislature, it should not be very difficult to prove that the likely political consequences of the
reapportionment were intended."). However, the plurality did not believe it necessary for the
majority party to ignore political considerations when developing district boundaries. Id. at 12930.
205. Id. at 132-33. (stating that "unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the
electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a groups [sic.]
of voters' influence on the political process as a whole" and that "[a] finding of
unconstitutionality must be supported by evidence of continued frustration of the will of the
majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair change to influence the
political process").
206. Id. at 132-33. The question for the Court was whether the members of the group whose
candidates were defeated retain the opportunity to exert effective influence in the state's political
process. Id. at 133-34; see also Alfange, supra note 114, at 245 (discussing the plurality view of
election results).
207. Alfange, supra note 114, at 247.
208. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 134 n.14 (plurality opinion) (holding the requirement of a
discriminatory effect is based on the particular characteristics of partisan gerrymandering).
209. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 161-85 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Justice Powell
disagreed as to how a plaintiff could show it. 21
suggested a multi-faceted approach that reviewed a number of
factors.211 However, even with a prima facie case established, Justice
state had a rational
Powell contended a plan would still be valid
2 12 if the
criteria.
neutral
permissible
on
basis based
3. The Aftermath of Bandemer
Lacking a majority standard to follow, the lower courts utilized
Justice White's plurality opinion. 2 13 One of the first applications of the
214
California
Bandemer standard occurred in Badham v. Eu.
Congressional
1982
the
challenged
Republicans unsuccessfully
reapportionment plan for the state as a violation of the Fourteenth
Many viewed the
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 2 15
redistricting plan as one of the most egregious gerrymandered plans of
the decade. 1 The district court construed Bandemer to hold that even
if plaintiffs proved a history of disproportionate results, they were also
required to prove a strong indication of lack of political power and the

210. Id. at 185 (supporting a need for a "heavy burden of proof' to exist).
211. Id. at 173. Justice Powell adopted Justice Stevens's concurrence in Karcher as a
foundation to determine unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering). Id. See TRIBE, supra note
66, at 1082 (reviewing Justice Powell's opinion and describing the factors to be used in order to
determine partisan gerrymandering). The factors Powell identified are: the shapes of voting
districts, adherence to established subdivision boundaries, the nature of the legislative
proceedings that resulted in the adoption of the apportionment law, legislative hisotry, and
available statistics showing population disparities or vote dilution. Id. But see Alfange, supra
note 114, at 252 (asserting Justice Powell provided no guidance for the lower courts to distinguish
between an unconstitutional gerrymander and a plan that gives the majority party an advantage at
the polls).
212. Bandemer,478 U.S. at 185 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
213. Badham v. March Fong Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd mere., 488 U.S.
1024 (1989) (applying Justice White's plurality opinion because it "provides the narrowest
grounds" for decision); see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (stating that when a
divided Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result obtains a majority of
five Justices, "the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
") (plurality opinion of Stewart,
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds ....
Powell and Stevens, JJ.).
214. Badham, 694 F. Supp. 664. The Court found the claim to be justiciable under Bandemer
even though Bandemer dealt with state legislative redistricting and this case dealt with
congressional redistricting. Id. at 668. The Court did not find the distinction to be valid based on
Baker and Bandemer. Id.
215. Id.
216. Lewyn, supra note 35, at 439. The plan placed three sets of Republicans incumbents
against each other and divided one Republican district into six different parts. Id. Before the
implementation of the plan, the Democrats had a one seat lead in the California congressional
delegation, but after five congressional elections held under the plan, the Democrat's won sixty
percent of all congressional elections even though they had won just over fifty-two percent of the
statewide two party congressional vote. Id.
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denial of fair representation. 2 17 The test required the plaintiffs to show
that they were effectively shut out of the entire political process. 2 18 In
addition to Equal Protection, the Republicans raised a First Amendment
claim related to the right of free association. 2 19 The district court
rejected the allegation based on Bandemer, explaining that the
220
Republicans were not completely shut out of the political process.
Other courts resolving
partisan gerrymandering claims quickly adapted
22 1
the Badham view.
The Republicans subsequently attempted to move away from
Badham's strict interpretation of Bandemer and challenged an alleged
Democratic gerrymander of the Texas congressional delegation in
Terrazas v. Slagle.2 22 The Texas district court in Terrazas asserted that
the focus of the effects prong should be on the structures of the state's
political system. 2 23 The court held that a valid challenge to partisan
gerrymandering will be satisfied when evidence is presented that shows
one political group is perpetuating its power through gerrymandering
and the wronged political group is unable to defeat this scheme through
its influence in another relevant political structure. 22 4 The court upheld
217. Badham, 694 F. Supp. at 670.
218. Id. at 672.
219. Id. at 675. The Republicans asserted the plan penalized Republican voters solely based
on their party affiliations, political beliefs, and associations and through limiting the public debate
on issues of public importance. Id.
220. Id. ("an individual or a group of individuals who votes for a losing candidate is usually
deemed to be adequately represented by the winning candidate and to have as much opportunity
to influence that candidate as other voters in the district...") (quoting Bandemer, 478 U.S. at
132). The Badham court found the Republicans did not allege Democratic representative entirely
ignored the interests of Republican voters. Id.
221. See, e.g., Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 397-99 (W.D.N.C 1992) (rejecting North
Carolina Republicans challenge to a Congressional redistricting plan where they could not allege
that the redistricting plan caused them to be "shut out of the political process."), affd mem., 506
U.S. 801 (1992); Republican Party of Va. v. Wilder, 774 F. Supp. 400, 405-06 (W.D. Va. 1991)
(rejecting Virginia Republicans claim of partisan gerrymandering in Congressional redistricting
which resulted in the pairing of Republican incumbents into the same district, for failing to show
that the redistricting would consistently degrade Republican voters influence in the political
process as a whole).
The district court held that evidence of an anticipated history of
disproportionate results did not satisfy the Bandemer standard. Pope, 809 F. Supp. at 397. The
court noted that a number of safe Republican seats were created by the plan, Republicans were
not precluded from influencing Democratic legislators and the Republicans First Amendment
rights were not violated. Id. at 397-99; see also Lewyn, supra note 35, at 439-43 (discussing
some of the district court decisions following Bandemer).
222. Terrazas v. Slagle, 821 F. Supp. 1162, 1173 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (rejecting the
interpretation of discriminatory effect under Bandemer to require a showing that the voters are
wholly ignored by the elected representatives).
223. Id. at 1174 ("The term political process as a whole means straightforwardly all the
structures of the state governmental system.").
224. Id.
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the plan, finding that the Republicans still had political influence in
other branches of the government. 2252 26Like Badham, the court rejected
the asserted First Amendment issues.
In fact, only in Republican Party of North Carolina v. Martin did227a
court find a constitutional violation using the Bandemer standards.
North Carolina Republicans were back in court this time challenging the
state's method of electing trial court judges. 22 8 Judicial candidates were
nominated in local party primaries held in each district and then
successful primary candidates from each district ran against each other
in a general statewide election. 229 The Republicans argued that the atlarge plan diluted Republican votes since judicial candidates had won
only one election since 1900, even though they won forty-three percent
of the vote in 1986 and forty-six percent in 1984 of the statewide vote in
contested races. 2 3
The Fourth Circuit found the plan to be an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. 2 3 1 The Fourth Circuit deemed
that the Republicans had shown a valid history of disproportionate
results and that the selection process reduced the likelihood that

225. Id. Specifically, the Terrazas court cited the ability of Republicans to elect candidates
for the statewide position of Governor and Lieutenant Governor as well as holding forty percent
of the state assembly. Id. at 1174-75.
226. Id. at 1174 ("Gerrymandering is concerned with dilution of political influence through
the manipulation of elective district boundaries, not with other abuses of the electoral process or
First Amendment violations."). But cf. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622
(1984) ("[an] individual's freedom to speak and to petition the Government for the redress of
grievances could not be vigorously protected unless a correlative freedom to engage in group
effort for those ends were not also guaranteed."); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357, U.S.
449, 460 (1958) ("freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of the liberty assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech"); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 66, at 1180
(noting that the Supreme Court has expressly held that freedom of association is a fundamental
right protected by the First Amendment).
227. Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F. 2d 943 (4th Cir. 1992). However, that
"victory" was short lived-in the elections for superior court judges, conducted just five days
after the district court concluded the trial finding an unconstitutional gerrymander, every
Republican candidates standing for the office of superior court judge was victorious at the state
level. Vieth v. Juberlirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1782 n. 8 (2004) (plurality opinion). The Fourth
Circuit remanded the case for reconsideration due to the success of the Republicans even under
the alleged unconstitutional gerrymandered plan. Id.; see Republican Party of N.C. v. Hunt, No.
94-2410, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 2029, at *2 (4th Cir. Feb. 12, 1996) (remanding the case to the
district court for reconsideration).
228. Martin, 980 F. 2d at 951.
229. Id. at 947.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 957. The Fourth Circuit found the case justiciable even thought it dealt with the
election of trial court judges and not legislative representatives. Id. However, a difference
existed as to the adjudication of the claim on its merits since it did not involve a legislative
districting plan. Id. at 952.
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Republicans would run, because the chance of success was almost
nonexistent. 23 2 The Martin court discussed the First Amendment claim,
but found it lacked merit. 233 Even though the court seemed to apply the
Bandemer standards and to move out of the shadows of Badham, the
circuit court emphasized that the holding was dependent on the specific
facts of the case. 234 The inability of the lower courts to eliminate
partisan gerrymandering created a desire 2 for
the Supreme Court to
35
provide new guidance in the Vieth decision.

III. DISCUSSION
Eighteen years after Bandemer, the Supreme Court, in Vieth v.
Jubelirer, faced the issue of partisan gerrymandering and again
attempted to provide proper judicial standards. 236 Part III.A will
provide an outline of the facts related to the case. 23 7 Part III.B will
discuss the lower court decisions. 23 8 Part III.C will review the Supreme
Court opinions authored in Vieth.23 9

232. Id. The Martin court found the electoral system which in effect created the a statewide
candidate for a local office representing a possible unconstitutional gerrymandering. Id. at 958.
The Martin court found persuasive the near century long inability for a Republican to be elected
superior court judge and the likely probability that the situation would remain. Id. However, the
Martin court held that even a "modicum of electoral success or access to the political process"
might have defeated the Republican's ability to establish aprimafaciecase. Id. This modicum of
success was achieved in the elections conducted after the decision when every Republican
candidate standing for office of superior court judge was victorious at the state level. Vieth v.
Juberlirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1782 n.8 (2004) (plurality opinion).
233. Martin, 980 F. 2d at 958. (finding the Republicans confused the protection offered by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments and attempted to extend First Amendment guarantees). The
Martin court asserted the First Amendment only protected the right to cast an effective vote by
prohibiting restriction on ballot access or limit the opportunity for voters to unite in support of a
candidate. Id. at 960. The election plan did not include direct impediments prohibited by the
First Amendment. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1983) (discussing
limitations of First Amendment protections in the context of voting, noting certain nondiscriminatory impediments are generally allowed).
According to the court in Martin,
Republican political goals are frustrated in the election of superior court judges, however, the
First Amendment only guarantees a right to participate in the political process, not a guarantee of
political success. Martin, 980 F. 2d at 958.
234. Martin, 980 F. 2d at 958. Regardless of it emphasis on the specific facts, Martin viewed
partisan gerrymandering that created grossly disproportionate results and made it difficult to
attract candidates or contributors as unconstitutional. Lewyn, supra note 35, at 442. In addition,
Martin rejected Badham and Pope's suggestion that minority party success in statewide elections
unrelated to gerrymandered districts may preclude a gerrymandering claim. Id.
235. See J. Clark Kelso, Vieth v. Jubelirer: Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 3
ELECTION L.J. 47 (2003) (discussing the motives of the Supreme Court in hearing the case).
236. Vieth v. Jubilirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004) (plurality opinion).
237. See infra Part II.A (discussing the facts of Vieth).
238. See infra Part III.B (discussing the lower court decisions).
239. See infra Part IlI.C (discussing the Supreme Court opinions). The majority of the Court
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A. Facts
After the 2000 census, Pennsylvania's General Assembly initiated the
process to redraw the state's Congressional districts. 2 40 At the time of
the redistricting process, the Republican Party held a majority of seats
in both state Houses as well as the Governor's office. 24 1 Under pressure
from members of the national Republican Party, the General Assembly
adopted a partisan redistricting plan.24 2 On January 3, 2002, the
plan and a few days later the
General Assembly passed a redistricting
24 3
law.
into
plan
the
signed
Governor
Shortly thereafter, Democrat Pennsylvania voters sought to enjoin the
state from implementing the redistricting plan. 24 4 According to the
complaint, the partisan plan violated a number of constitutional
principles including Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Privileges and
dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, but was unable to reach consensus as to the reason behind the
dismissal. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1773. Justice Kennedy served as the fifth vote to dismiss the
claim, but did not agree with all of the plurality's reasoning. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1792 (Kennedy,
Despite the dismissal, a majority of five Justices affirmed partisan
J., concurring).
gerrymandering claims as justiciable. Id. at 1799 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The remaining
Justices argued the Court lacked judicially manageable standards to decide partisan
gerrymandering claims making these claims non-justiciable. Id. at 1773 (plurality opinion).
However, the five Justice who believed partisan gerrymandering justiciable fractured into four
separate opinions in regards to the proper standards. See infra Part III.C.3.a-c (discussing the
dissenting opinions).
240. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1773. The population figures based on the 2000 census indicated that
Pennsylvania was entitled to 19 Representatives in Congress. Id. This represented a reduction of
two seats from the previous delegation. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. The national party desired to adopt a partisan plan as a punitive measure in response
to pro-Democrat redistricting plans developed in other states. Id. Republican leaders, Tom
DeLay, House Majority Leader, and Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House, urged Pennsylvania
legislators to redistrict in order to maintain a Republican majority in the House. Toobin, supra
note 7, at 63.
243. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1773. Originally, the State House of Representatives and the State
Senate passed different versions of a redistricting plan. Vieth v. Pa., 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 535
(M.D. Pa. 2002). A Conference Committee was formed in order to reach a compromise between
the two bills. Id. During the deliberations of the Conference Committee, their Republican
counterparts ignored the views of Democratic members. Id. The bill passed the Conference
Committee, but all Democratic members of the committee voted against it. Id. The redistricting
bill was designated as Act 1. Id.
244. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1773. The plaintiffs were registered Democrats and Pennsylvania
citizens. Vieth, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 535. Plaintiff Richard and Norma Jean Vieth resided in
Lebanon County, which was incorporated in District 16 under Act 1. Id. Plaintiff Susan Furey
resided in an area of Montgomery County that formed part of a new District 6 under Act 1. Id.
The defendants included the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and various executive and
legislative officers responsible for enacting and implementing the redistricting plan. Vieth, 124 S.
Ct. at 1773. The plaintiff filed the suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania. Vieth, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 537.
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Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the plaintiffs'
24 5
right to free association protected by the First Amendment.
Specifically, the voters alleged the plan created malaportioned districts
in violation of the one person, one vote standard.
The allegations
also contended7 that the plan constituted an illegal political
24
gerrymander.
B. The District Court Decisions

A three-judge panel was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284.248
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the
district court partially granted. 24 9 The district court granted the motion
with respect to the political
gerrymandering claim and all claims against
the Commonwealth. 2 50 However, the district court proceeded to trial
245. Vieth, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 537.
246. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1773. According to the 2000 census, Pennsylvania had a population
of 12,281,054. Vieth, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 535. If divided equally between the nineteen
congressional districts, the population per district would have been 646,371 or 646,372. Id.
Under Act 1, District 7 included 646,380 while Districts 1, 2 and 17 each had a population of
646,361 creating a nineteen person deviation between the districts. Id.
247. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1773. Allegedly, the districts were created solely on the basis of
partisan advantage and paid no attention to traditional districting principles. Id. Under Act 1,
eighty-four local governments (counties, cities, boroughs or townships) were split among
different congressional districts. Vieth, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 535. The plan split Montgomery
County, where Plaintiff Furey resided, into six different congressional districts. Id. Under the
redistricting plan controlling before Act t, only twenty-seven local governments were divided
into different congressional districts. Id. at 535-36. The plaintiffs alleged the new electoral
districts were designed to shut Democrats out of the political process and caused plaintiffs harm,
because congressional members who do not represent their views would represent them. Id. at
536.
248. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1774. A three-judge panel is required when a suit is filed challenging
the constitutionality of the apportionment of Congressional districts or the apportionment of any
statewide legislative body. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2000). Chief Judge Edward Becker of the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals appointed the Honorable Richard Nygaard, United States Circuit Judge
for the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the Honorable William H. Yohn Jr., United States District
Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Honorable Sylvia Rambo, Senior United
States District Judge for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Vieth, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
249. Vieth, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 532.
250. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1774. Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment violation, the District
Court held the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an actual discriminatory effect as required by
Bandemer. Vieth, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 547. Following Bandemer, The court determined the
plaintiffs had not been shut out of the political process. Id. Without much discussion, the
Privileges and Immunities claim was found irrelevant to the stated cause of action. Id. at 548
(noting that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects against discrimination on the basis of
state citizenship and no allegation was made that the plaintiffs were citizens of another State or
newly arrived citizens of Pennsylvania). The District Court found the First Amendment violation
to be "coextensive" with the equal protection claim. Id. Since the court determined the plaintiffs
failed to state a claim in regards to equal protection, the court dismissed the First Amendment
claim on the same grounds.
id. The District Court dismissed the claims against the
Commonwealth on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
Id. at 538-39 (noting the Eleventh
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with the apportionment claim.2 5 1 In a 2-1 decision, the district court
found for the plaintiffs.2 5 2 The court required the legislature to develop
a new redistricting plan in line with the one person, one vote
standard. 253 The General Assembly duly passed another plan, which
satisfied the court's conditions. 254 The plaintiff attempted to enjoin this
plan on similar grounds as the first plan. 255 The court found that the
the court's earlier
electoral districts were not malapportioned and, citing
256

ruling, rejected the political gerrymandering claims.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs appealed against the dismissal of the
257
political gerrymandering claims to the United States Supreme Court.
The Court noted probable jurisdiction on June 27, 2003.258 On April
28, 2004, the Court decided whether the plaintiffs alleged a valid
and if manageable standards
complaint of partisan gerrymandering
259
complaint.
the
existed to adjudicate
C. The Supreme Court Decision
In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
Amendment generally prohibits federal courts from hearing suits by private parties against States
and their agencies).
251. See Vieth, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 541-43 (discussing the plaintiffs success in showing a
prima facie case of a violation of the one person, one vote standard as required by Article I,
section 2 of the United States Constitution); supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the one person, one vote
standard).
252. Vieth v. Pennsylvania., 195 F. Supp. 2d 672 (M.D. Pa. 2002). The District Court held
the defendants did not employ a good faith effort to draw districts of equal population. Id.
Furthermore, the defendants failed to show the deviation was necessary to achieve a legitimate
goal. Id. at 677-78. Judge Yohn, dissenting from the opinion, found that the defendants had
provided sufficient justification for the deviation based on the desire to avoid splitting additional
voter precinct districts. Id. at 679 (Yohn, J., dissenting).
253. Vieth, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 678-79.
254. Vieth v. Pa., 241 F. Supp. 2d 478 (M.D. Pa. 2002). On April 17, 2002, the General
Assembly passed a revised congressional redistricting plan signed by the Governor the following
day. Id. at 480. The new redistricting bill was designated Act 34. Id.; see Issacharoff & Karlan,
supra note 12, at 555 (outling some of the clearly partisan gerrymandering techinques in the
plan).
255. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1774.
256. Vieth, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 478. The court found Act 34 to be a zero-deviation plan. Id. at
481. In addition, the court viewed Act 34 to be similar to Act 1 and stood on its earlier ruling that
the plan did not effectively shut the plaintiffs out of the political process foreclosing the partisan
gerrymandering claims. Id. at 484-85.
257. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1774. A direct appeal to the Supreme Court is allowed if a threejudge panel adjudicates the matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2000) (allowing a direct appeal to the
Supreme Court from an order granting or denying an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any
civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a
district court panel of three judges).
258. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 539 U.S. 957 (2003).
259. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. 1769 (plurality opinion).
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district court's decision dismissing the partisan gerrymandering

claim. 260 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia determined the claim
represented a political question and that the Supreme Court lacked the
ability to decide the matter.2 6 1 Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion
agreed with the plurality as to the judgment, but disagreed that all
partisan gerrymandering claims fall within the political question
doctrine. 26 2 In three dissenting opinions, four Justices argued partisan
gerrymandering was aJusticiable issue and proposed possible standards
63
to evaluate the claims.

1. The Plurality Opinion
The plurality opinion asserted that partisan gerrymandering claims
represent a non-justiciable political question lacking judicially
manageable standards. 264 After a review of the relevant facts, the
discussion began with a history of partisan gerrymandering in the
United States tracing back to the colonial period and the Constitutional

Convention. 265 Viewing Article I, Section 4 as providing a remedy for
partisan gerrymandering, the plurality contended that Congressional
power to restrain the gerrymander had not been idle. 26 6 The lack of
idleness was highlighted by the fact that Congress and the states have
introduced a number of bills designed to curb partisan
2 67
gerrymandering.
260. Id. (plurality opinion).
261. Id. at 1778 (plurality opinion); see infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the plurality opinion).
262. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1793 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see infra Part llI.C.2 (discussing
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion).
263. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1810 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1817 (Souter, J., dissenting,
joined by Ginsburg, J.,); id. at 1825 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see infra Part I1I.C.3.a (discussing
Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion); infra Part III.C.3.b (discussing Justice Souter's dissenting
opinion; infra Part llH.C.3.c (discussing Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion).
264. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1773 (plurality opinion).
265. Id. at 1774 (plurality opinion) ("The political gerrymander remained alive and well
(though not yet known by that name) at the time of the framing.").
266. Id. at 1775 (plurality opinion). Article I, section 4 reads "The Times, Places and Manner
of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Places of choosing Senators." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. The plurality outlined the
various requirements under the different Apportionment Acts passed by Congress. Vieth, 124 S.
Ct. at 1775-76. At different times these Acts included a contiguous territory requirement in an
attempt to defeat partisan gerrymanders. Id. However, today the only Congressional requirement
is for single member districts. Id. at 1776 (plurality opinion) (citing 2 U.S.C. § 2c); see also
BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 37, at 24-26 (discussing some of the provision passed by Congress
related to apportionment).
267. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1776 (plurality opinion) (identifying several bills introduced in
Congress and state legislatures designed to curb gerrymandering); see Center for Voting And
Democracy,
Redistricting Legislation in the
U.S.
Congress, Jan.
2004
at
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The plurality next turned
doctrine.2 68 After reviewing
whether a political question
reasoned that no judicially

to the origin of the political question
the six Baker factors used to determine
existed, the plurality applied them and
discernible and manageable standards

existed for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims.2 6 9 Bandemer,
which established claims of partisan gerrymandering to be justiciable,
270
had not established a majority standard for the lower courts to follow.
Further, the plurality noted that only one lower court since Bandemer

found

sufficient grounds

to establish

unconstitutional

partisan

gerrymandering. 27 1 The plurality argued that Bandemer and the
eighteen years worth of lower court decisions since Bandemer had
failed to establish a proper standard.27 2
In an attempt to show that a workable standard does not exist, the
plurality reviewed the standards put forth by Bandemer, the appellants,
and the other Justices. 273 The plurality concentrated first on Justice
White's plurality opinion in Bandemer, which required a showing of
intentional discrimination as well as discriminatory effect on the
2 74
plaintiffs in order to show unconstitutional political gerrymandering.
After sketching the standard announced by Justice White, the plurality
presented lower court decisions as well as the analyses of academic
commentators showing the standard to be unmanageable. 27 5 The
plurality quickly dismissed Justice White's standard as unworkable and
declined to affirm it as constitutionally sufficient. 276 The plurality also
discarded Justice Powell's opinion in Bandemer as not establishing a

http://www.fairvote.org/redistricting/congress.htm (discussing the various bills introduced related
to eliminating gerrymandering) (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
268. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1776 (plurality opinion).
269. Id. at 1776 (plurality opinion).
270. Id. at 1777 (plurality opinion); see supra Part II.E (discussing the Supreme Court
decision of Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986)).
271. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1777 (plurality opinion).
272. Id. at 1777 (plurality opinion). "Eighteen years of judicial effort with virtually nothing to
show for it justify us in revisiting the question whether the standard promised by Bandemer
exists." Id. at 1778 (plurality opinion).
273. Id. at 1778-92 (plurality opinion).
274. Id at 1778-80 (plurality opinion). "We begin our review of possible standards with that
propsed by Justice White's plurality opinion in Bandemer because, as the narrowest ground for
the decision in that case, Justice White's plurality opinion has been the standard used by lower
courts." Id. at 1778 (plurality opinion); see supra notes 204-O5 and accompanying text
(discussing Justice White's plurality opinion in Bandemer).
275. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1779-80 (plurality opinion) (noting "the legacy of the plurality's test
is one long record of puzzlement and consternation").
276. Id. at 1780 (plurality opinion). In fact, neither the appellants nor any Justice argued to
maintain the standard. Id. (plurality opinion).
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manageable standard.27 7
278
The plurality next reviewed the appellants' proposed standard.
The appellants had preserved Justice White's intent-plus-effect
requirement, but modified the evidence required to achieve the
standard. 279 The appellants urged the Court to look at the mapmakers'
predominant intent in creating the district boundaries and the effect of
the redistricting plan on the ability of a group of voters to achieve a
majority of seats if they received a majority of the votes. 2 80 Even with
the modification,
the plurality was not convinced that the standard was
28 1
manageable.
Moreover, the plurality rejected the appellants' attempt to employ

racial gerrymandering standards as a basis for partisan gerrymandering
standards. 282 Justice Scalia did not regard political affiliation as an
immutable characteristic. 28 3 Due to the constant shift in political views
and connections, the plurality failed to see how a majority party and the
effects of political gerrymandering could be determined.284
In addition, the plurality considered the standards proposed by the
dissenting Justices. 285 As initial evidence of lacking standards, the
plurality noted that the four dissenters developed three different
standards, which were different from the two in Bandemer and the one

277. Id. at 1784 (plurality opinion). The plurality considered Justice Powell's standard a
"totality of the circumstances analysis" to determine "fairness." Id. (plurality opinion). The
measurement of fairness also did not seem to be a judicially manageable standard for the
plurality. Id. (plurality opinion).
278. Id. at 1780-84 (plurality opinion).
279. Id. at 1780 (plurality opinion).
280. Id. (plurality opinion). Predominant intent could be shown "by evidence that other
neutral and legitimate redistricting criteria were subordinated to the goal of achieving partisan
advantage." Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Brief for Appellants at 19). Regarding the effects
prong, the appellants proposed to replace Justice White's effect test and show effect is established
when "(1) the plaintiffs show that the districts systematically 'pack' and 'crack' the rival party's
voters, and (2) the court's examination of the 'totality of circumstances confirms that the map can
thwart the plaintiffs' ability to translate a majority of votes into a majority of seats." Id. at 1781
(plurality opinion) (quoting Brief for Appellants at 20) (citations omitted).
281. Id. at 1780-84 (plurality opinion).
282. Id. at 1780 (plurality opinion). The plurality viewed redistricting based on race as being
unlawful. Id. at 1781 (plurality opinion). However, the plurality viewed partisan gerrymandering
as a "lawful and common practice." Id. (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia believed utilizing
racial standards in political gerrymandering cases would allow disgruntled voters to almost
always allege partisan advantage was the predominant motivation. Id. (plurality opinion).
283. Id. at 1782 (plurality opinion) (stating that "[a] person's politics is rarely as readily
discernible-and [never] as permanently discernible-as a person's race") (emphasis in
original)).
284. Id. (plurality opinion).
285. Id. at 1784-92 (plurality opinion).
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proposed by the appellants. 286 The plurality reviewed each proposal
court. 287
and found each one lacked manageable standards for the lower
Even though Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, the
plurality still reviewed his opinion. 2 88 The plurality asserted that Justice
Kennedy's disposition in the case was not legally available. 2 89 The
plurality urged the lower courts to view Justice Kennedy's vote as
supporting a finding that2 partisan gerrymandering falls within the
political question doctrine. J

In conclusion, the plurality held that no constitutional provision
provided a judicially enforceable limit on the political considerations
that the states and Congress may use when redistricting. 29 1 The
partisan
plurality advocated overruling Bandemer and finding
292
questions.
political
non-justiciable
claims
gerrymandering

2. The Concurring Opinion
The concurring opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, urged courts
to avoid finding the use of political reasons in creating electoral districts
completely unlawful. 293 For Justice Kennedy, a finding of unlawful
286. Id. at 1784 (plurality opinion).
287. Id. at 1785 (plurality opinion). The plurality dismissed Justice Stevens's opinion by
noting the standards to determine lawful racial gerrymandering and partisan gerrymandering are
very different. Id. ("A purpose to discriminate on the basis of race receives the strictest scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause, while a similar purpose to discriminate on the basis of politics
does not."); see Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 964 (1996) (plurality opinion) ("We have not
subjected political gerrymandering to strict scrutiny.") (emphasis in original). According to the
plurality, Justice Souter's "fresh start" test seems to provide a manageable standard, but in fact
created too many "how" questions for the courts to answer. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1787 (plurality
opinion) ("[N]o element of his test looks to the effect of the gerrymander on the electoral success,
the electoral opportunity, or even the political influence, of the plaintiff group. We do not know
the precise constitutional deprivation his test is designed to identify and prevent."). Without much
discussion, the plurality dismissed Justice Breyer's standard as extremely vague. Id. at 1788-89
("[W]e neither know precisely what Justice Breyer is testing for, nor precisely what falls the
test.").
288. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1790-92 (plurality opinion).
289. Id. at 1790 (plurality opinion). The plurality maintained that the Court had two options
in affirming the lower court's decision. Id. at 1792 (plurality opinion). The Court could have
affirmed because political districting presents a non-justiciable question or because the correct
standard, which identifies unconstitutional political districting, had not been met in this case. Id.
According to the plurality, the Court could not affirm because of the inability to develop a
manageable standard. Id. (plurality opinion).
290. Id. at 1792 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "[wie suggest that [the lower courts]
must treat [Justice Kennedy's vote] as a reluctant fifth vote against justiciability at district and
statewide levels-a vote that may change in some future case but that holds, for the time being,
that this matter is nonjusticiable").
291. Id. (plurality opinion).
292. Id. (plurality opinion).
293. Id. at 1792-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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of

political

classifications.294 In dealing with these issues, the Court faced two

obstacles: the lack of comprehensive and neutral principles for drawing
electoral boundaries and the lack of rules to limit judicial
involvement. 295 The evidence presented by the appellants in Vieth did

not prevail over these obstacles. 296

The traditional approach of

redistricting through the use of contiguity and compactness was limited,
especially in terms of constructing a proper remedy. 2 97 Justice Kennedy

viewed the appellants' claim, asserting that a majority of voters should
elect a majority of the congressional delegation, as unfounded.298
However, Justice Kennedy refused to go as far as the plurality in finding
all claims of partisan gerrymandering non-justiciable. 29 9 For Justice

Kennedy, the arguments for non-justiciability and the inability to
establish0 a standard did not foreclose further discussion in future
30

cases.

The Fourteenth Amendment standard governed, but Justice Kennedy
believed that the First Amendment might provide a more relevant
30 1
standard to determine unlawful partisan gerrymandering claims.
Under First Amendment analysis, Justice Kennedy considered whether
political classifications were used to burden a group's representational
rights. 30 2 According to Justice Kennedy, the First Amendment analysis
294. Id. at 1793 (Kennedy, J.,concurring) (Stating unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering
occurs when political classifications are "applied in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to
any legitimate legislative objective").
295. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
296. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
297. Id. at 1794. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
298. Id. at 1793. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
299. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy refused to follow the plurality even
though he thought the plurality had "demostrate[d] the shortcomings of the other standards that
have been considered to date." Id. at 1794 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
300. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). ("It is not in our tradition to foreclose the judicial process
from the attempt to define standards and remedies where it is alleged that a constitutional right is
burdened or denied."). Justice Kennedy believed the Court had already entered the "political
thicket" of apportionment through the adoption of the "one person, one vote" rule and therefore
should not limit its review of other gerrymandering claims. Id. at 1795 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy argued for caution in closing judicial review especially when the constitutional
issue affected a person's right to vote. Id. at 1796 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy
worried that if the court abandoned judicial relief to parties, the partisan gerrymanders would be
encouraged to enhance their unlawful activities. Id. at 1793 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
301. Id. at 1797 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
302. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy contrasted this question from the
arguments of the plurality. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). The plurality discounted a First
Amendment basis arguing the use "would render unlawful all consideration of political affiliation
in districting." Id. at 1786 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In Justice Kennedy's view, a court could
grant relief under the First Amendment if the state "impose[d] burdens and restrictions on groups
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provided a greater foundation for courts since it removed the
complicated question of when a generally permissible classification is
used for impermissible purposes and instead it focused on whether the
rights based on ideology, beliefs, or
legislation burdens representational
3 3
political association. 0
Justice Kennedy noted the apparent contradiction in the plurality
opinion that partisan gerrymanders are incompatible with democratic
principles. 304 This inconsistency allowed for the possibility of finding
manageable standards. 30 5 While not endorsing a standard proposed by
did believe workable standards
any of the Justices, Justice Kennedy
30 6
might emerge in the near future.
3. The Dissenting Opinions
The dissenting Justices agreed on the justiciability of partisan
30 7
gerrymandering but disagreed as to the proper standards to apply.
Justice Stevens focused on Supreme Court precedent involving
apportionment and racial gerrymandering claims to develop a
standard. 308 Justice Souter discounted all earlier standards developed
by the courts and adopted a new method. 3° Justice Breyer argued for3 10a
standard to eliminate the unjustified entrenchment of political parties.
a. Justice Stevens's Dissent
For Justice Stevens, the main question in Vieth was whether partisan
gerrymandering claims were justiciable. 3 1 1 Regardless of the different
standards proposed, Justice Stevens found it significant that five
members of the Court supported the idea that partisan gerrymandering
claims were justiciable. 3 12 Justice Stevens believed that it would be a
radical departure from Supreme Court precedent if partisan
or persons by reason of their view.., unless the [s]tate shows some compelling interest." Id. at
1797 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see supra, Part Ili.C.3 (discussing the use of the First
Amendment as a basis to determine unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering).
303. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1798 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy understood this
analysis to allow a more "pragmatic or functional assessment that accords some latitude to the
States." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).

304. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
305. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
306. Id. at 1799 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
307. See infra Part III.C.3.a (discussing Justice Stevens's dissent); infra Part III.C.3.b
(discussing Justice Souter's dissent); infra Part III.C.3.c (discussing Justice Breyer's dissent).
308. See infra Part llI.C.3.a (discussing Justice Stevens's dissent).
309. See infra Part I.C.3.b (discussing Justice Souter's dissent).
310. See infra Part III.C.3.c (discussing Justice Breyer's dissent).
311. Vieth, 124 S.Ct. at 1799 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
312. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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gerrymandering claims were found to be beyond judicial
competence. 31f Illustrated in the dissent, the history and attitude of the
Court's involvement in legislative districting disputes mandated a role

for the Court. 3 1 4 For Justice Stevens, the principles of Bandemer and
Baker confirmed the logic that political gerrymandering claims are
justiciable.3 15 Justice Stevens believed that the district court ruling
should be reversed, but based his decision on narrow grounds dealing
31

only with the single-member district partisan gerrymandering claims. 6
Justice Stevens dismissed the plurality's claim that judicially

manageable standards did not exist. 3 17 He noted that earlier Supreme
Court decisions used a number of factors to determine the validity of
districts. 3 18 Justice Stevens illustrated how courts had used these

factors successfully in racial gerrymandering cases. 3 19

Since a

judicially manageable standard existed for racial gerrymandering cases,
Justice Stevens believed that the political question doctrine concerns
had no merit. 320 For him, the plurality's distinction between racial and

313. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Today's plurality opinion would exempt governing officials
from that duty in the context of legislative redistricting and would give license, for the first time,
to partisan gerrymanders that are devoid of any rational justification."
Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
314. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens stated the main goal of legislative
apportionment is to "achiev[e] ...fair and effective representation for all citizens." Id. at 1800
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting from Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964)).
315. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens quoted from the portion of Baker affirming
the holding that "U]udicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and
familiar .... Id. at 1801 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226
(1962)). Justice Stevens further affirmed the idea that political and racial gerrymandering claims
are not distinguishable based on justiciability grounds. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
316. Id. at 1799 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens believed that statewide claims
alleging partisan gerrymandering were too much of an "ambitious project" for the Court to tackle
in this case. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, Justice Stevens believed the single district
claim alleging partisan gerrymandering were valid. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
believed the plaintiff, Susan Furey, established proper standing, that the district-specific claim
was not barred by the Bandemer rejection of statewide partisan gerrymandering claims, and in
regards to her specific electoral district, she articulated a valid Equal Protection claim in line with
earlier Supreme Court voting rights cases. Id. at 1800 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
317. Id. at 1801 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
318. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens again used language from Bandemer to
support his argument. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). (-[T]he merits of a gerrymandering claim
must be determined by reference to the configurations of the districts, the observance of political
subdivision lines, and other criteria that have independent relevance to the fairness of
redistricting.") (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 165 (1986) (Powell, J.,concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
319. Id. at 1802 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
320. Id. at 1803 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "The racial gerrymandering cases therefore supply a
judicially manageable standard for determining when partisanship, like race, has played too great
of a role in the districting process." Id. at 1810 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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partisan gerrymandering in terms of judicially manageable standards
lacked credibility. 321 Justice Stevens did not find the distinction based

on the plurality's assumption that partisanship is ordinary and lawful
valid in terms of justiciability. 322 He also noted that the same basic

issue in both racial and partisan gerrymandering claims exists, namely,
whether a single, non-neutral issue controlled the creation of the
the Constitution. 323

electoral districts in such a manner that it violated

Justice Stevens did not believe the plurality had put forth a valid
the difference between racial and partisan
argument distinguishing
32
gerrymanders. F
Justice Stevens then appraised the argument of the appellants. 325 He
argued that the statewide claims should be dismissed based on
standing. 326 However, Justice Stevens found the specific district
challenge warranted review and continued to draw a connection

between racial and partisan gerrymanders. 327 Gerrymandering created a
cognizable harm by disrupting the relationship between the voter and
the elected representative. 3 28 For Justice Stevens, this harm was even

321. Id. at 1803 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
322. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens used a First Amendment argument to show
the unconstitutionality of discrimination based on political belief and association. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see Elrod v. Bums, 437 U.S. 347 (1976) (holding discriminatory governmental
decisions that burden fundamental First Amendment interests are subject to strict scrutiny).
Justice Stevens drew a parallel between the First Amendment patronage cases to partisan
gerrymandering claims. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1803-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he relevant
lesson of the patronage cases is that partisanship is not always as benign a consideration as the
plurality appears to assume."). Therefore, according to Justice Stevens, political affiliation is not
a proper motive to exclude voters from a electoral district. Id. at 1803 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see supra Part Ifl.C.3 (discussing the use of the First Amendment as a basis to determine
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering).
323. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1804 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Dixon, One Man, One Vote,
supra note 36, at 32 (stating "racial gerrymandering is simply a particular kind of political
gerrymandering").
324. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1804 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens believed Justice White
in Bandemer articulated the idea best by stating "[tihat the characteristics of the complaining
group are not immutable or that the group has not been subject to the same historical stigma may
be relevant to the manner in which the case is adjudicated, but these differences do not justify a
refusal to entertain such a case." Id. at n. 15 (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 125
(1986) (White, J., plurality opinion)).
325. Id. at 1805-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 1805 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens believed that Court decisions since
Bandemer had changed the requirements for standing which closed off the appellant's statewide
partisan gerrymandering claim. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Hays, 515
U.S. 737, 745 (1995) (imposing a standing requirement that plaintiffs to reside in the districts
they are challenging).
327. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1806 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
328. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The harm is caused because the elected official in a
gerrymandered district "will infer that [ J success is primarily attributable to the architect of the
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329
greater in the case of partisan gerrymandered districts.

The dissent of Justice Stevens rejected the plurality's notion that
partisan considerations are perfectly legitimate. 33 A total elimination of

political considerations in the redistricting process was not practicable
or necessary. 331 However, the creation of districts must rest on neutral
criteria based on the equal protection requirements. 3 32 In order to
assess a challenge to a specific district, Justice Stevens endorsed the
standard established in Shaw and its progeny. 333 For Justice Stevens, a
rational basis test should be used, in place of the strict scrutiny test
discussed in Shaw, in determining the unconstitutionality of a specific
district's plan. 334 Justice Stevens viewed the specific district challenge
complaint as falling within this standard and argued for a reversal of the
3

judgment and remand for further proceedings.

b. Justice Souter's Dissent
Justice Souter argued for a five-part test to determine unconstitutional
3 36
partisan
concept
framed the
7
question.s gerrymandering.
The interests of The
fairness
were of
not fairness
served because
the
district rather than to a constituency defined by neutral principles." Id.
329. Id. at 1807 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "The problem simply put, is that the will of the
cartographers rather than the will of the people will govern." Id.
330. Id. at 1801 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens passionately stated:
[u]ntil today ... there has not been the slightest intimation in any opinion written by
any Member of this Court that a naked purpose to disadvantage a political minority
would provide a rational basis for drawing a district line. ON THE CONTRARY, our
opinions referring to political gerrymanders have consistently assumed that they were
at least undesirable, and we always have indicated that political considerations are
among those factors that may not dominate districting decisions.
Id. at 1810-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
331. Id. at 1808 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
332. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens confirmed the state must act in a neutral
manner and the Equal Protection Clause deposits this requirement upon the state. Id.
Proportional representation of various groups was not the goal of Justice Stevens. Id. at 1811
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
333. Id. at 1812 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra Part II.C.4 (discussing the Court
development of judicial standards related to racial gerrymandering).
334. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1812 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Under my analysis, if no neutral
criterion can be identified to justify the lines drawn, and if the only possible explanation for a
district's bizarre shape is a naked desire to increase partisan strength, then no rational basis exists
to save the district from an equal protection challenge." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Hence,
Justice Stevens believed that the rational basis standard would not place an undue burden on state
redistricting processes, but would allow the courts to prohibit extreme partisan plans. Id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
335. Id. at 1813 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
336. Id. at 1817 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg joined in Justice Souter's dissenting
opinion. ld. at 1815 (Souter, J., dissenting).
337. Id. at 1815 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter used the foundation of "fair and
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3 38
Bandemer plurality's standard set too high a hurdle for the plaintiffs.
Justice Souter did not see the lower court's inability to formulate3 39a
workable standard as proof that such a standard did not exist.
Although Justice Souter agreed partisan gerrymandering was justiciable,
he believed that the Court needed to start anew in formulating a
manageable standard based on the formula devised in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green.34 0 Similar to Justice Stevens's approach,
specific districts and
Justice Souter limited his test to challenges against
34 1
challenges.
statewide
to
test
the
refused to extend
Under Justice Souter's test, the plaintiff would need to show five
elements in order to establish a prima facie case of unconstitutional
partisan gerrymandering. 34 2 The first element required that the plaintiff
demonstrate membership within a cohesive political group. 343 Next, the
plaintiff would need to satisfy the requirements of standing and show
that the created district of the plaintiffs residence paid scant regard to

the traditional districting principles. 34 4 Third, the plaintiff would need
to demonstrate a specific correlation between the district's deviations
effective representation" in describing fairness. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 162 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Justice believed that everyone understood the term fairness in reference to political
gerrymandering cases, but admitted that it did not have the same "hard edge of one person, one
vote." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
338. Id. at 1816 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter viewed the interpretation of Bandemer
as requiring a showing of a group to be "essentially ... shut out of the political process" in order
to prove discriminatory effect to constitute an excessive burden. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting)
(quoting Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 139); see supra Part II.E (discussing the Supreme Court decision
of Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986)).
339. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1816 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter thought the Court created
the problem in the first place, and therefore it was the responsibility of the Court to resolve it. Id.
340. Id. at 1817 (Souter, J., dissenting); see supra note 64 (discussing the McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) burden-shifting standard).
dissenting). "I would limit consideration of a
341. Vieth, 124 S.Ct. at 1817 (Souter, J.,
statewide claim to one built upon a number of district-specific ones." Id. at 1820 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
342. Id. at 1817 (Souter, J., dissenting).
343. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter rebuffed the plurality's claim that a person's
political identity is rarely discernible. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting); see supra Part III.C.1
(discussing plurality's view). The fact that political gerrymandering occurs implies that the
political gerrymander was able to identify relevant groups and establish district boundaries to its
benefit or determent. Vieth, 124 S.Ct. at 1817 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting).
344. Vieth, 124 S.Ct. at 1817 (Souter, J., dissenting); see United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737
(1995) (requiring residence in a challenged district for standing). Justice Souter referred to
"contiguity, compactness, respect for political subdivisions, and conformity with geographic
features" as principles of traditional districting. Vieth, 124 S.Ct. at 1817 (Souter, J., dissenting).
According to Justice Souter, an exact formula that balanced the principles was not required, since
courts have been able to make these determinations in earlier decisions and the specific type of
method used to gerrymander is case specific. Id. at 1818 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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from traditional districting principles and political group's population
distribution. 345 The fourth element required the plaintiff to present a
hypothetical district, which included his residence, more in line with the
traditional principles of redistricting. 34 6 Finally, the plaintiff would
34 7
need to show that the gerrymander acted with intent to discriminate.
Once the prima facie case is established, the burden would shift to the
alleged gerrymander. 34 8 The alleged gerrymander would need to show
349
the district was created for reasons beyond naked partisan advantage.
Justice Souter discounted the plurality's claims that the test did not
provide manageable standards. 35 The test was not hard-edged, but it
was also not wholly subjective. 35 1 A precise measure of the harm was
not necessary since all of the Justices agreed partisan gerrymandering
taken too far is unfair. 352 The test provided a method that would assist
the Court in determining when a partisan gerrymander had gone too
far.35 3 Justice Souter believed that the right course would be to reverse
the district court and allow the plaintiff
to amend the district-specific
354
complaint in compliance with the test.
c. Justice Breyer's Dissent

345. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1818 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter provided possible
examples including a showing that "when towns and communities were split, Democrats tended
to fall on one side and Republicans on the other." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
346. Id. at 1817 (Souter, J., dissenting). For example, the proposal should have a lower or
higher proportion of the plaintiffs group based on the method employed to dilute the vote. Id. at
1819 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also supra Part H.A.1 (discussing the different methods of a
political gerrymander).
347. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1819 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter did not think that
meeting this element was difficult, especially with a plan devised by a single major party and if
the plaintiff satisfied the third and fourth elements of the prima facie case. Id. (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
348. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
349. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Such reasons could include the avoidance of racial vote
dilution, complying with the one person, one vote requirement or proportional representation
among its political parties. Id. at 1817 (Souter, J., dissenting); see Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,
990 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding compliance with section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 is a compelling state interest).
350. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1821 (Souter, J., dissenting); see supra note 285-84 and
accompanying text (discussing the plurality's criticism of Justice Souter's plan).
351. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1821 (Souter, J., dissenting).
352. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter even quoted Justice Scalia showing exact
determinations are not always necessary. Id. at 1822. "To achieve what is, from the standpoint
of the substantive policies involved, the 'perfect' answer is nice - but it is just one of a number of
competing values." Id. at 1822 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting from Justice Antonin Scalia, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1178 (1989)).
353. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1821 (Souter, J., dissenting).
354. Id. at 1822 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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In his dissent, Justice Breyer asserted the idea that fair and effective

representation included more than just having equally populated
electoral districts. 3 55 A proper process must exist that allows for the will
of the majority to establish an effective government. 356 Political parties
357

and single member districts play an important role in this process.
For Justice Breyer, political parties function as a way for voters to
express satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the elected officials' views
by allowing voters to support them or vote for another party. 358 Due to
the role of political parties, Justice Breyer found it natural that politics
would play a role in the creation of electoral districts. 35 9 Justice Breyer
did not36 believe traditional districting principles were politically
neutral.

The "unjustified entrenchment" of political parties served as the focal
point for Justice Breyer's opinion. 36 1 This type of entrenchment would
make it difficult for voters to remove elected officials who were no
longer in line with the majority of the voters' views. 362 Court
intervention would not always be necessary since other procedural
solutions existed for the non-entrenched political party. 3 63 However,
Justice Breyer did not have complete faith in the non-judicial remedies

355. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
356. Id. at 1822-23 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
357. Id. at 1823 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In addition to providing greater legislative stability,
Justice Breyer viewed single member districts as facilitating the ability of the voter to identify the
party in power and decide if the voter wants to maintain the party power or vote them out of
office. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
358. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
359. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer believed it was necessary for politics to play a
role in electoral districting since a random creation may create a larger exaggeration in election
results and possibly may eliminate minority party representation. Id. at 1824 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
360. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Breyer viewed these boundaries as based on
traditional principles, "represent[ing] a series of compromises of principle" and "an uneasy truce,
sanctioned by tradition, among different parties seeking political advantage." Id. (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). But see Dixon, One Man, One Vote, supra note 36, at 35 (finding "[t]he idea of a socalled nonpartisan or neutral commission offers no certain path to representational virtue. Indeed,
it is essentially a 'three monkeys' policy: speak no politics, see no politics, hear no politics, and
hope that men are angels").
361. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1825 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer defined unjustified
entrenchment as the ability of the minority to maintain power "purely [as] the result of partisan
manipulation and not other factors." Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
362. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). ("[Plolitical gerrymandering that so entrenches a minority
party in power violates basic democratic norms and lacks countervailing justification.").
363. Id. at 1826. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer viewed statewide officials, Congress
and voters as agents that could negate the power of the gerrymander. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Breyer also discussed the use of state commissions to limit the extent of partisan
gerrymandering. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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available to a gerrymandered voter. 364 Justice Breyer expressed
concern that new technology would allow an entrenched gerrymander to
maintain its position of unjust power. 36 5
Thus, under these
36
6
circumstances, court action would be justified.
Justice Breyer had faith that courts would be able to identify
3 67
unjustified entrenchment and design a remedy for extreme cases.
While the determination by the Court would not be an easy one, Justice
Breyer believed it was possible. 36 8 Finally, Justice Breyer challenged
the assertion of the plurality that maintained that the numerous proposed
standards implied a workable standard did not exist. 369 Justice Breyer
believed that the Court, when writing a majority opinion, would
be able
to reconcile their differences and select a majority standard.3 7 °
IV.

ANALYSIS

The majority of Justices in Vieth correctly affirmed that partisan
gerrymandering claims are justiciable. 37 1 Part IV.A endorses the idea
that the Justices were correct in confirming the justiciability of partisan

364. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). "[W]e cannot always count on a severely gerrymandered
legislature itself to find and implement a remedy." Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). "The party that
controls the process has no incentive to change it." Id. at 1826-27. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
365. Id. at 1827. (Breyer, J., dissenting). ("The availability of enhanced computer technology
allows the parties to redraw boundaries in ways that target individual neighborhoods and homes,
carving out safe but slim victory margins ... .
366. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
367. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer highlighted the fact that after the 1980 census
about one third of all redistricting was done either directly by the courts or under the courts'
injunctive authority. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting); see Samuel Issacharoff & Karlan, Judging
Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643,
1688-90, & nn. 227-33 (1993) (observing that following the 1980 census, federal courts played
an active role in identifying and remedying unjustified redistricting plans).
368. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1827-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In order to show that the Court
could determine unjustified entrenchment, Justice Breyer provided a number of hypothetical
examples of what he would consider unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. Id. at 1828.
(Breyer, J., dissenting). These hypothetical examples illustrated his belief that a fair inference of
unconstitutional redistricting may arise in circumstances where a majority has twice failed to win
a majority of legislative seats, where there is a radical departure from traditional boundarydrawing criteria, or where there has been unjustified mid-cycle redistricting. Id. (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
369. Id. at 1829 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
370. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]he more thorough, specific reasoning that accompanies
separate statements will stimulate further discussion."). Justice Breyer believed the discussion
necessary especially since Justice Kennedy continued to search for an appropriate standard. Id.
(Breyer, J., dissenting) ; see Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 12 at 561 (noting the dissenting
opinions included "many common threads").
371. See supra Part uI.C.2-3 (discussing each Justice's view on the justiciability of
redistricting challenges).
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gerrymandering claims. 3 72 Part IV.B reviews the dissenting opinions of
Vieth, demonstrating some of their limitations. 37 3 Part IV.C argues that
Justice Stevens's proposed standard provides the most 3 promising
4
7
judicial approach to settling partisan gerrymandering claims.
A. Maintaining a Foundation: Justiciability Confirmed
The Court's affirmation of justiciability was correct because none of

the factors established in Baker, which decide political questions, relate
to partisan gerrymandering. 3 75 The Congressional authority to alter
regulations related to elections does not remove the issue from the
Court's jurisdiction. 376 In arguing non-justiciability, the main focus for
the plurality was the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
37 7
standards for resolving the question of partisan gerrymandering.
Since Baker, Court precedent clearly shows that discoverable standards
exist to resolve these claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.3 78 The
idea that the Court might have to expressly create a specific test is not
new ground for the Court. 379 The prior development of a manageable
standard by the Court in racial gerrymandering cases makes the Court's
task that much easier. 3 80 The Court has already been able to distinguish

372. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the correctness of the majority of Justices who reaffirmed
partisan gerrymandering claims as justiciable).
373. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the different formulations of the Justices but concluding
each one lacks a certain element).
374. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the reasoning for applying Justice Stevens's proposed
standard to partisan gerrymandering claims).
375. See supra note 86 (discussing the factors and analysis necessary to determine whether a
particular issue constitutes a political question); supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text
(discussing the Supreme Court's application of Baker's factors to partisan gerrymandering in
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), finding that none of them applied to partisan
gerrymandering).
376. Michael C. Doff, The Supreme Court Gives PartisanGerrymanderingthe Green Light or at Least a Yellow Light, FIND LAW'S WRIT, at http://writ.findlaw.com/dorf/20040512.html
(last visited May 12, 2004).
377. See id. (defining discoverable standards as those that can be traced to the Constitution's
text, structure, or history, and manageable standardsas those that lead to predictable and sensible
results).
378. See supra note 101 (discussing the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to vote
dilution cases). The Baker majority held that "U]udicial standards under the Equal Protection
Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts, that a discrimination reflects no
policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action." Baker, 369 U.S. 226; see Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 226 (1962).
379. See Doff, supra note 376 (arguing that in almost in every area of Constitutional law, the
Court has established certain tests in order to enforce rights described in generalities by the
Constitution).
380. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text (discussing the Gingles three prong test).
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predominance on the basis of race in the creation of electoral

districts. 381 In establishing a majority standard, the Court's charge will
be to determine how to measure whether the predominant factor in the
creation of electoral district boundaries was based 382
on partisan politics

which subordinated traditional districting principles.

Beyond the creation of uniform standards, the Court has a necessary

role in resolving disputes because of the cognizable harm partisan
gerrymandering causes voters. 3 83 The goal of the partisan gerrymander
is to discriminate against a particular group.3 84 This discrimination
violates the constitutional requirement of fair and effective
representation established through Supreme Court precedent.3 8 5 A lack
of fair and effective representation reduces the overall stability of the
386
government by encouraging greater voter apathy and indifference.
Partisan gerrymandering reduces the opportunity for genuinely
contested general elections and places greater emphasis on primary
elections, where most voters belong to the extreme partisan edge of the
political party. 38 7 The domino effect of gerrymandering creates a more
polarized House of Representatives and reduces cooperation and
consensus building between parties. 3 88 The Supreme Court has an
important role in remedying these harms and the corresponding

381. See supra notes 154-67 and accompanying text (discussing the Shaw line of cases that
established and identified traditional principles for district plans and unconstitutional violations of
those principles based on race).
382. See Dorf, supra note 376 (comparing partisan gerrymandering cases to racial
gerrymandering cases and pointing out that in ruling on racial gerrymandering cases the Court did
not simply ask whether race was a factor, but instead asked if race was the predominant factor).
383. See Lewyn, supra note 35, at 407-09 (discussing the harm caused by partisan
gerrymandering); Samuel Issachroff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: PartisanLockups
of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN.

L. REV.

643 (1998)

(exploring

how partisan

gerrymandering allows dominant parties to lock up political institutions to forestall competition);
Sasha Abramsky, The Redistricting Wars, THE NATION, Dec. 29, 2003, at 15 (arguing the
inaction of the Supreme Court will most likely result in a Republican stranglehold on the House
of Representatives for the rest of the decade due to the party's ability to gerrymander the district
maps in certain states). But see Carvin, supra note 62, at 4-5 (arguing partisan gerrymandering
does not create a harm to voters since the person's right to vote is not violated).
384. See supra Part II.A.1 (defining gerrymandering and introducing its basic operation and
effect).
385. See Part II.C.3 (discussing the issue of fair and effective representation).
386. Ortiz, supra note 56, at 478-86; see supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text
(discussing recent outcomes and effects of partisan gerrymandering). Some commentators
believe the decline of competitive races and long periods of one-party control of the House erodes
the accountability and legitimacy of the chamber. E.g., Hirsch, supra note 58, at 179 (arguing
partisan gerrymandering reduces political fairness, accountability and responsiveness).
387. Toobin, supra note 7, at 64.
388. Id.
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results. 389
Therefore, the Court's confirmation
390
gerrymandering claims are justiciable is proper.

that

partisan

B. Possible Foundations:The Dissenting Opinions of Vieth
Vieth did put an end to the impossibly high standard of Bandemer,

but it still left the lower courts searching for the proper standard to
apply. 39 1 A majority of the Justices found partisan gerrymandering
but quickly divided over the proper standard to apply
claims justiciable,
39 2
in these cases.
decision. 39 3
Justice Kennedy provided the swing vote in the Vieth
Justice Kennedy concurred in the opinion, but he refused to follow the

reasoning of the plurality, which consequently, made his opinion read
more like a dissent. 394 While Justice Kennedy refused to endorse a
specific standard, his opinion did provide insight as to possible
standards that would be satisfactory. 39 5 Justice Kennedy focused on
First Amendment protections, finding them to possess the necessary
elements to determine unconstitutional partisan gerrymandenng.
According to Justice Kennedy, the First Amendment analysis provided
389.

Henry J. Stem, Political Gerrymander Upheld in 5-4 Supreme Court Decision, New

York Civic, at http://www.nycivic.org/articles/040429.html (last visited Apr. 29 2004).
390. See Part II.C (discussing the Court's expansion of justiciable apportionment related
issues to include partisan gerrymandering).
391.

Charles Lane, Justices Order New Look at Texas Redistricting Case. WASH. POST, Oct.

19, 2004, at A21. "Vieth was a monumental non-decision, a case in which five justices said
partisan gerrymandering cases can go forward, but also said there is no standard by which to
judge them." Id. (quoting Richard Hasen, election law specialist, Loyola Law School in Los
Angeles); see supra Part II.E.3 (discussing the application of the Bandemer standard by the lower
courts).
392. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1969, 1810 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 1817
(Souter, J., dissenting); Id. at 1825 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see supra Part III.C.3.a (discussing
Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion); supra Part llI.C.3.b (discussing Justice Souter's dissenting
opinion); supra Part III.C.3.c (discussing Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion).
393. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1792-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Richard L. Hasen, Looking For
Standards (In All the Wrong Places): PartisanGerrymandering Claims After Vieth, 3 ELECTION

L.J. 626, 627 (2004).
394. See Hasen, supra note 393, at 640-41 (analyzing the Vieth decision and in particular
Justice Kennedy's concurrence). "Justice Kennedy's concurrence has the virtue of shaking up the
thinking in this area, throwing out a standard that no one on the current Court defends and that
was no help to plaintiffs, and leaving the door open for future challenges." Id. at 641.
395. Id. Justice Kennedy suggested satisfactory standards might eventually emerge from
"helpful discussions on the principles of fair districting discussed in the annals of parliamentary
or legislative bodies," through better computer technology, or through an analysis of the "First
Amendment interest of not burdening or penalizing citizens because of their participation in the
electoral process, their voting history, their association with a political party, or their expression
of political views." Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1794-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
396. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1797-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see supra Part III.C.2 (discussing
Justice Kennedy's view of the First Amendment in resolving partisan gerrymandering claims).
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a greater foundation for courts since it removed the complicated
question of when a generally permissible classification is used for
impermissible purposes and instead it focused on whether the legislation
burdens representational rights based on ideology, beliefs, or political
association. 397 By not fully joining the plurality, Justice Kennedy kept
alive the voters' ability to challenge partisan gerrymandering, but he
stopped 8short of endorsing a standard, which future courts could
follow.

39

On the other hand, Justice Souter's dissenting opinion introduced a

completely new method of measuring unconstitutional
gerrymandering claims. 3 99

partisan

This standard, based on the McDonnell

Douglas burden shifting method, may be the most familiar to
litigants. 400 However, the standard completely ignores the development
of the jurisprudence related to disputes over apportionment.4 0 1 Acts of
racial and political gerrymandering are closely related. 4 2 The creation
of two distinctly different standards to measure closely related
unconstitutional acts would only create further confusion for the
courts. 403 A suitable standard for partisan gerrymandering should

therefore build upon earlier Court decisions dealing with apportionment
4 4

and racial gerrymandering. 0
Justice Breyer's opinion deplored partisan gerrymandering. 40 5 The
397. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1798 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy understood this
analysis to allow a more "pragmatic or functional assessment that accords some latitude to the
States." Id.
398. See Hasen, supra note 393, at 641 ("It is easy to criticize Justice Kennedy's concurrence,
for it puts plaintiffs in an impossible position. It tells them that if they file partisan
gerrymandering suits, they are almost certain to lose, unless they can come up with a partisan
gerTymandering standard that meets underspecified and somewhat contradictory criteria.").
399. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1815 (Souter, J., dissenting).
400. See Hasen, supra note 393, at 639. ("Justice Souter's standard, with its familiar vote
dilution concepts and burden shifting borrowed from employment law cases, would lead to the
most consistent results across cases ... ").
401. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1815-22 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter believed it was time
to "start anew" in solving these claims. Id. at 1817.
402. See Mike Clark-Madison, Meanwhile, at the Supreme Court..., AUSTIN CHRON., Dec.
19, 2003 (observing that if the gerrymander can convince the courts that the gerrymandered plan
did not intend to disenfranchise racial minority voters, even though minority voters are almost all
Democrats, the plan may pass constitutional muster).
403. See, e.g., Barbara C. Salken, Balancing Exigency and Privacy in WarrantlessSearches to
Prevent Destruction of Evidence: The Need for a Rule, 39 HASTINGS L. J. 283, 333 (1988)
(arguing that a failure of circuit courts to develop a coherent constitutional standard frustrates the
Fourth Amendment's constitutional restraint on unreasonable police behavior).
404. See Hasen, supra note 393, at 639 ("What should be clear, however, is that just because a
test is easily administrable and therefore likely to lead to roughly consistent results in the courts
on similar sets of facts is not reason enough to adopt it.").
405. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1822 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See supra Part IHI.C.3.c (discussing
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opinion focused on the structural terms of voting and found that the
self-interest of elected state legislators can undermine a healthy
democratic process. 40 6 Further, Justice Breyer listed a series of
methods used by4 errymanders that could create unconstitutional
redistricting plans.40 In identifying these he described the components
of a well-functioning democracy instead of a specific standard to
determine violations. -4 08 Due to Justice Breyer's lack of specific
for lower
standards, the opinion did not provide the proper foundation
40 9
gerrymandering.
partisan
courts to measure unconstitutional
C. Foundationfor the Future:Justice Stevens's Standard
Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion provides a foundation to
establish proper standards. 4 10 Justice Stevens correctly built upon the
Court's racial gerrymandering cases as a foundation for resolving
4 11
The racial gerrymandering
partisan gerrymandering claims.
standards balance the constitutional requirements with the compelling
state interest of affirmatively protecting the rights of minority voting
groups. 4 12 As Justice Stevens highlights, courts have been able to
establish effective methods of identifying and remedying redistricting
4 13 Applying
plans when this balance has tipped in the wrong direction.
racial gerrymandering precedents to partisan gerrymandering is
appropriate because regardless of the type of gerrymandering, the result
is the same: the promotion of voting power of one group over
another. 4 14 In addition, the standard can still be sufficiently stringent so
that courts will not be involved in every redistricting process, but will
still be able to intervene when partisan gerrymandering has gone too

Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion).
406. Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the
DoctrinalInterregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 510 (2004).
407. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1828 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

408. Id. at 1828-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
409. Id. at 1788-89 (plurality opinion). Without much discussion, the plurality dismissed
Justice Breyer's standard as extremely vague. Id. at 1789 (plurality opinion) ("[W]e neither know
precisely what Justice Breyer is testing for, nor precisely what fails the test.").
410. See supra Part Ill.C.3.a (discussing Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion).
411. Id.
412. See supra Part II.C.4 (discussing the standards of justiciability applied to racial

gerrymandering).
413. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 12, at 561-62; see supra Part II.C.4 (discussing
relevant Supreme Court cases providing protection from vote dilution).
414. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the harm caused by partisan gerrymandering, especially
the reduction in competitive elections); supra Part III.C.3a (discussing Justice Stevens's
dissenting opinion)
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4 15

V. IMPACT

At first, the ruling in Vieth appears to increase the difficulty for
plaintiffs challenging partisan gerrymandering claims. 4 16 Part V.A
argues that in the short term, partisan gerrymandering will remain
unchecked by the courts. 4 17 The decision might increase the call for a
proportional electoral system or other grassroots changes to the electoral
system. 4 18 Part V.B asserts that in the long term Vieth will help
establish a manageable standard and focus on areas of constitutional law
that were not historically considered applicable to partisan
4 19
gerrymandering claims.
A. Short Term Confusion
Four Justices in Vieth revisited the justiciability of partisan
gerrymandering claims. 420
The plurality found no judicially
manageable standards applicable to partisan gerrymandering claims and
invoked the political question doctrine. 4 2 1 However, no foundation
existed to reapply the political question doctrine to partisan
gerrymandering claims. 422 Unfortunately, this posture may encourage
415. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 12, at 561-62.
416. The Court Punts, WASH. POST, May 2, 2004, at B06. ("The consequence of the
splintered decision is that political gerrymandering suits remain a theoretical possibility . .
417. See infra Part V.A (discussing the short term impact of Vieth).
418. See John B. Anderson & Robert Richie, A Better Way to Vote, LEGAL TIMES, May 17,
2004, at 68 (explaining that a proportional system of government will provide great
accountability and competition); Patrick Mulvaney, Not Quite an Exact Portrait,THE NATION, at
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20041115&c=l&s=mulvaney

(Oct. 28, 2004) (calling

for proportional representation as is currently used in Germany, Portugal, Switzerland and
Greece).
419. See infra Part V.B (discussing the long term impact of Vieth).
420. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the plurality opinion). The plurality did not simply
raise the issue of justiciability, but argued that the lower court should treat this view as the
majority view due to Justice Kennedy's reasoning. See supra note 290 (quoting the plurality's
suggestion that lower courts treat Justice Kennedy's vote as a reluctant fifth vote for nonjusticiability).
421. See RUSH, supra note 35, at 13 (arguing that the Court has been unable to develop
manageable standards due to incorrect assumptions regarding individual and group voting
behavior and questionable or unclear references to constitutional amendments); see also supra
Part LI.C.1 (discussing the plurality opinion); supra Part H.B (discussing the political question
doctrine).
422. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 12, at 543; see Herman Schwartz, Out with
Gerrymanders!, THE NATION, at http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040719&s
=schwartz (July 1, 2004) ("Most of Scalia's questions are bogus and have already been
answered."); see also supra Part I.C (discussing the Court's progress in establishing manageable
standards).
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to dismiss partisan gerrymandering claims on
district court judges 423

justiciability grounds.
Overall, in the short term, the decision will neither alter the acts of
the partisan gerrymander nor the struggle to stop it. 424 The decision in
Cox v. Larios essentially represents where litigants find themselves in
the wake of Vieth. 425 In Cox, the district court found the redistricting

plan unconstitutional based on the one person, one vote principle of the
Equal Protection Clause. 42 6 The district court rejected the partisan

gerrymandering claim, finding Bandemer still controlling. 4 27 The
Supreme Court summarily affirmed the decision, seeming to base the

decision on the one person, one vote rule. 428 As illustrated in Cox, due
to the inability of the Court in Vieth to definitively affirm the standards
423. See Shapiro v. Berger, 328 F. Supp. 2d 496, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding Vieth limited
the scope of justiciability for claims of partisan gerrymandering); supra Part I.B (discussing the
grounds of justiciability). See generally, Hasen, supra note 393 (examining the Vieth opinion and
concluding that people aggrieved by partisan redistricting should seek political rather than
judicial remedies).
424. See Lane, supra note 391, at A21 ("Veith was a monumental non-decision, a case in
which five justices said partisan gerrymandering cases can go forward, but also said there is no
standard by which to judge them." (quoting Richard Hasen, election law specialist, Loyola Law
School in Los Angeles)).
425. Cox v. Larios, 124 S. Ct. 2806 (2004). The Supreme Court rendered a decision on June
30, 2004, only a few months after the Vieth decision. Id. See supra notes 13 and 55 (discussing
the Cox case). But see Steven F. Huefner, The Current Status of One-Person-One-Vote: An
Overview, ELECTION LAW @ MORTIZ, at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/districts_
reapp.html (last visited May 27, 2005) (arguing the Cox decision questions the validity that small
deviations will still be tolerated by the Court).
426. Cox, 124 S. Ct. at 2806 (Stevens, J., concurring). The reasons for the deviations included
"a deliberate and systematic policy of favoring rural and inner-city interests at the expense of
suburban areas" and "an intentional effort to allow incumbent Democrats to maintain or increase
their delegation." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320,
1327 (N.D. Ga. 2004)). The district court did not find these reasons justified deviation from the
one person, one vote principle. Id. at 2807-08. (Stevens, J., concurring).
427. Id. at. 2808 (Stevens, J., concurring). The district court determined the Republicans had
not been shut out of the political process. Id. (Stevens, J. concurring). Justice Stevens asserted
the factual findings of the district court confirmed that an impermissible partisan gerrymander is
"visible to the judicial eye and subject to judicially manageable standards." Id. (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
428. Id. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, held "the equal-population principle remains
the only clear limitation on improper districting practices, and we must be careful not to dilute its
strength." Id. Justice Scalia, in dissent, argued against summarily affirming. Id. at 2809 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Justice Scalia asserted that "politics as usual" may fall within a traditional
districting principle and therefore questioned if the Georgia plan violated the Constitution. Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting). However, a summary affirmance normally indicates that the lower court
got the result right, but not necessarily that it used the correct reasoning. Ill. State. Bd. of
Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 182-83 (1979). Justice Stevens wrote that,
even though the issue was not raised by appellants in Cox, the Georgia districting plan constituted
an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander under Justice Breyer's standards set forth in Vieth. Cox,
124 S. Ct. at 2808 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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of an unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, the Court is brought
back to the Karcher outlook of striking down a redistricting plan based
on the one person, one vote standard while
arguing in dictum that the
429

plan is an unconstitutional gerrymander.

B. Long Term Benefit
Vieth did not resolve the question left open in Bandemer, namely,
what are the judicially manageable standards to adjudicate partisan

gerrymandering claims.4 30 However, the Court in Vieth did provide
more realistic standards then the Court in Bandemer.43 1 Vieth's
importance lay in the fact that it ended the impossibly high standards

required to challenge a partisan gerrymandering plan.4 32 Furthermore,
the decision opened new avenues to explore in creating judicially
manageable standards. 43 3 The decision will allow lower courts to adopt
different standards to settle these disputes. 4 34 The Court's desire for
lower courts to move beyond Bandemer and use the discussion in Vieth
to foster new thoughts is demonstrated by the Court's recent
announcement in Jackson v. Perry.4 35 In Jackson, the Court granted a

motion for the district court to reconsider its approval of the Texas 2002

Congressional redistricting plan using Vieth as a basis for the

429. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 12, at 566-67.
430. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, In 'Vieth,' Court Continues to MisunderstandGerrymandering,
N.Y.J.J. (arguing the Justices are unable to develop a proper standard because they fail to
understand the political science principles of symmetry) available at http://www2.als.edu/faculty/
sgottlieb/vieth.pdf (Aug. 19, 2004) at 4.
431. See supra Part Ml.E (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Bandemer, 478
U.S. 109 (1986)).
432. Johnson-Lee v. City of Minneapolis, No. 02-1139, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19708, at *37
(D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2004) (concluding Vieth effectively overruled Bandemer since a majority of
the Justices found the Bandemer standard unmanageable); see Hasen, supra note 393, at 626
(observing that the standard announced in Bandemer was nearly impossible for plaintiffs to
meet).
433. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1829 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting a
through discussion of the relevant theories might lead to a better understand of a workable
standard). At least one commentator believes Vieth represents an invitation to litigants to work at
the state constitutional level to develop a nationwide consensus about how such claims should be
handled. James A. Gardner, A Post-Vieth Strategy for Litigating Partisan Gerrymandering
Claims, 3 ELECTION L.J. 643, 643-44 (2004).
434. See supra Part II.E.3 (discussing attempts by the lower courts to interpret Bandemer); see
also Adam Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751 (2004)
(arguing that a procedural rule limiting the frequency of redistricting to a ten year cycle will
promote partisan fairness).
435. Jackson v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 351 (2004) (mem.) vacating Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp.
2d 451 (E.D. Tex 2004) (remanding for reconsideration based on Vieth a district court apprival of
the Texas redistricting plan); see supra notes 59-63 (discussing the situation in Texas).
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reconsideration.436

Based on Vieth, an additional avenue to determine manageable
standards in order to regulate partisan gerrymanders could include the
application of the First Amendment right of association. 43 7 In the past,
courts mainly focused on the Equal Protection Clause to provide

protection to gerrymandered voters while ignoring some of the
important First Amendment protections. 438 Justices Kennedy and
Stevens both mentioned First Amendment rights as a possible
constitutional standard to resolve partisan gerrymandering. 43 9 As a

result, courts may now give greater consideration to the First
Amendment in providing a foundation to manage partisan
gerrymandering disputes.
VI. CONCLUSION

The majority of the Justices correctly affirmed the justiciability of
partisan gerrymandering cases in Vieth. Although the majority failed to
provide a clear standard for the lower courts, the Justices properly
436. Lane, supra note 391, at A21. The Supreme Court ordered the three-judge panel to
review its January decision allowing a gerrymandered congressional districting plan to be
implemented. Id. The action will not affect the 2004 election in Texas. Id. The Supreme Court
told the district court to take account of the Vieth decision in deciding the partisan
gerrymandering claims. Id. The decision allows the Court to avoid making a decision during the
2004 election cycle, but still deal with the issue. Id. But see Paul Rosenzweig, Some Wishful
Thinking on Texas Redistricting, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION PRESS ROOM, at
http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/edI02704c.cfm (October 27, 2004) (arguing the
Court uses this procedure on a regular basis and "it means absolutely nothing about the merits of
the case").
437. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787 (1983) (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968), stating two kinds of rights: "the right of individuals to associate for the
advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political
persuasion, to cast their votes effectively. Both of these rights, of course, rank among our most
precious freedoms."); see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 357
(1997) (affirming that "[t]he First Amendment protects the right of citizens to associate and to
form political parties for the advancement of common political goals and ideas").
When deciding whether a state election law violates First and Fourteenth Amendment
associational rights, we weigh the "character and magnitude" of the burden the State's
rule imposes on those rights against the interests the State contends justify that burden,
and consider the extent to which the State's concerns make the burden necessary.
Id. at 358.
438. Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First Amendment
Right of Association, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1212-13 (2003).
439. See supra Part III.C.2 (discussing Justice Kennedy's opinion); supra Part III.C.3.a
(discussing Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion).
440. Schwartz, supra note 422 ("Thanks to Anthony Kennedy and the Court's unanimous
rejection of the Bandemer tests, lawyers and the lower courts can still attack severe partisan
gerrymandering and now have a promising First Amendment approach."); see supra note 226
(discussing the role of the First Amendment as a protection against partisan gerrymandering).
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repudiated Justice White's plurality opinion in Bandemer, which set an
exceedingly difficult standard for proving a claim of illegal partisan
gerrymandering. Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion in Vieth provides
the best guidance for the lower courts and should be adopted. In the
short term, the jurisprudence of partisan gerrymandering will most
likely not change dramatically. However, the decision in Vieth will
continue the search for judicially manageable standards.
The
uncertainty in the proper standards to apply in partisan gerrymandering
case may not have been fully resolved in Vieth, but the decision will
slowly remove the uncertainty.

